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 ABSTRACT 
Daniel Maltsev 
Evaluating the Euro: An exploration of the Euro’s impacts on the European Monetary Union 
(Under the direction of Douglas Elvers) 
 
The question of whether or not the Euro’s implementation has had a positive impact on 
the Eurozone remains frequently debated.  The purpose of my research is to provide a holistic 
view of the Euro’s impact on the Eurozone.  Shortly after the Euro’s implementation, Eurozone 
nations experienced an increase in economic and financial growth that they otherwise would not 
have.  However, the Eurozone’s economic heterogeneity and lack of timely integration set the 
Eurozone on a path of economic divergence, culminating the Eurozone Debt Crisis. Since the 
debt crisis, European leaders have striven toward increased Eurozone integration in an effort to 
strengthen the European Monetary Union; but, due to economic and political factors, will most 
likely fail to do so in a timely manner.  As a result, the Eurozone will continue, at least in the 
short-run, to experience a continued economic divergence and a resulting decrease in lack of 
popular support for the Euro. 
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       INTRODUCTION 
Originally implemented in 1999, the Euro has become a modern example of the 
economic effects of a monetary union.  Eleven countries initially discontinued the use of their 
traditional national currency in favor of the Euro, thus establishing the European Monetary 
Union (EMU).  Since 1999, the EMU has grown to include nineteen total member nations, with a 
growing number of other European nations expressing interest in joining the union.   
However, the debate as to whether the implementation of the Euro has had a positive or 
negative effect on the Eurozone countries is more contentious than ever.  Supporters of the Euro 
argue that monetary integration has led to increased trade and a more integrated European 
economy, while critics point to the lack of substantial European economic growth and the multi-
year debt crisis that has strained the EMU.  Both sides of the debate present various, 
substantiated arguments that make the Euro’s efficacy even harder to judge.   
Additionally, the lack of established criteria by which the Euro can be judged further 
complicates the matter.  Definitive metrics to measure the Euro’s success were never set, and 
there is no timetable with regular intervals at which EMU members can evaluate their economic 
position and choose whether or not to continue with the Euro. Withdrawal from the EMU would 
be next to impossible, and legally controversial (Athanassiou, 2009). In short, the 
implementation of the Euro set the EMU on a course of monetary integration that is, at least in 
the short term, irreversible.    
This thesis aims to present a holistic view of the Euro’s impact on the Eurozone’s 
original eleven countries, focusing on both economic and financial effects as well as cultural and 
political considerations.  Because the Eurozone is a political and economic union, political and 
social considerations must be made in order to effectively analyze the Euro’s impact.   
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Nations that implemented the Euro have experienced economic and financial benefits at 
times, and serious hardships in others.  Furthermore, the heterogeneity of EMU nations – both 
economically and culturally – makes for a complex and nuanced union.  Because the Eurozone is 
so politically and economically diverse, what is good for one nation may not necessarily be 
beneficial to the rest.  A large governing body, made up of representatives from each EMU 
nation and charged with governing the Eurozone, is generally slow to act because of the 
immensely difficult task of building consensus due to the varying interests of the member states.  
This complication has been particularly present in the last few years because of the strain the 
debt crisis put on the EMU.   
In general, the majority of the Eurozone countries can be grouped into one of two 
economic groups – the Northern Eurozone Area (NEA) and the Southern Eurozone Area (SEA).  
I have chosen to use this grouping because it provides a solid basis for analysis of the Eurozone 
as a whole. The Northern Eurozone Area includes: Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, 
Finland, and Luxembourg.  The Southern Eurozone Area includes: Spain, Portugal and Italy.  
This grouping is in line with several economists’ analysis, and is based on the economic models 
of the respective regions (Hall 2014; Hope 2016; Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon 2010; Hassel 2014; 
Lane 2006).  Simply put, the NEA economies tend to emphasize growth driven by exports and 
tight fiscal policies; the SEA economies tend to emphasize growth led by increased demand and 
generally have looser fiscal policies. Athough each individual country’s economy is by no means 
identical to another in its group, the economic models are similar enough to warrant such a 
grouping.  France and Ireland, although discussed in the thesis, have been left out of the two 
groupings because they do not necessarily fit the criteria of either group.  
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 Although this methodology excludes two countries from specific consideration, it allows 
for an effective structure by which the overall effect of the Euro on the Eurozone can be 
discussed.  Additionally, 9 of the original 11 Eurozone nations fit into either the NEA or SEA 
grouping criteria, allowing for the vast majority of the Eurozone to be represented in the 
analysis. 
 Additionally, I have singled out Germany for additional discussion because of the pivotal 
role it has played throughout the Euro’s life.  In the years between the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Euro’s implementation, the Germans had significant say in the vision of the Euro.  
Furthermore, particularly during and after the Euro crisis, Germany emerged as the leading voice 
in the Eurozone, both politically and economically.  
 Each section of the thesis is structured chronologically in four time periods: Pre-Euro 
implementation (1992-1999), after the Euro’s implementation leading up to the debt crisis (1999-
2008), the Eurozone debt crisis (2008-2014), post-debt crisis (2014-present).  An additional 
section in the chapter on the overall Eurozone discusses an outlook on the future of the 
Eurozone.   
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Current literature on the topic of the Euro’s impacts generally focuses on one specific 
economic area or consequence (e.g. the Euro’s effect on Real Interest Rates or Current Account 
Balances).  These relatively narrow approaches fail to present a holistic picture of the Euro’s 
overall impact on the Eurozone, thus making it harder to judge the Euro’s overall success or 
failure.  My research aims to tie in both sides of the Euro debate to illustrate the Euro’s overall 
impact, making it easier to project the short and long-term economic effects EMU countries will 
face.  
Analyzing the Euro’s overall historic trends, successes, and failures allows for a more 
informed projection of the future, as opposed to using any one particular data point (such as a 
month or one year’s worth of economic data).  Thus, it is important to establish a timeline to 
contextualize the Euro’s progression through the 21st century.  The timeline that I will focus on 
will include: the goals of establishing the Euro (1992-1999), the Euro’s impacts in its first decade 
(1999-2009), the Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-2014), the Euro since the debt crisis (2014-present) 
and what the future of the Euro might entail. 
Establishing the Euro (1992-1999) 
In 1992, twelve European nations signed the Maastricht Treaty in response to European 
economic instability.  A key goal of the Maastricht Treaty was to establish a single currency 
within Europe in order to strengthen the single market within the EU.  This singular currency, the 
Euro, was set to start circulating in 1999, given that member nations met a set of economic 
criteria.1 
                                            
1	The full Maastricht Treaty can be found at https://europa.eu/european-
union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf	
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  At the time, a monetary union with such size and scope had never been attempted 
before, effectively making the move toward a common European currency unprecedented.  As a 
result, the supporters of the Euro needed to build a strong case in support of the common 
currency; one that aligned with Europe’s economic and political goals.   
The Euro was established under the assumptions that it would: “bring Europe ever closer 
together, and was the next step in Europe’s integration; that the closer economic integration 
would lead to faster economic growth; and that this greater economic integration and the 
consequent greater political integration would ensure a peaceful Europe” (Stiglitz, 2016).  Since 
the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, it gave member nations seven years to prepare, both 
economically and politically, for the Euro. 
Given the macroeconomic instability throughout Europe at the time, the promise of 
economic integration and stability was attractive.  A key advantage of implementing the Euro 
would be the removal of foreign exchange risk, which “would cut transaction costs, and increase 
planning security for transborder trade and investment…” (Regling, Deroose, Felke & Kutos, 
2010).  Advocates of the Euro argued that the removal of foreign exchange risk would greatly 
benefit an economically active, yet geographically small area such as Europe.   
For example, before the Euro, German long-term investment in Italy could be 
discouraged by fluctuating exchange rates between the Deutschmark and the Lira. German 
investors would be unsure that the value they invested would produce their expected return given 
the difference in exchange rates between the time of investment and the time of return.  The 
introduction of the Euro effectively removed this risk, thereby making foreign investment within 
the Eurozone less risky and more attractive to European investors.   
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Furthermore, advocates argued that an integrated monetary policy would bring about 
macroeconomic stability in the region and lead to stable inflation rates that would not be heavily 
affected by single-country economic shocks, and would disallow currency devaluation as a 
means of emergency economic alignment (Regling et al., 2010).  Advocates made the case that 
the Eurozone economy would, in theory, behave similarly to that of a single nation, with the 
traditional economic boundaries erased and integration encouraged.   
However, many on the other side of the debate were skeptical of the Euro’s potential 
advantages.  Critics of the Euro were primarily concerned about “the ability of the single 
monetary policy to address country-specific shocks and about the interaction between centralized 
monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policy” (Regling et al, 2010).  A singular Eurozone 
monetary policy coupled with individual countries’ fiscal policies could lead to economic 
divergence among member nations, particularly given the varying economic tendencies among 
Eurozone nations. 
A singular currency would mean that individual countries would not have the ability to 
nominally devalue their national currency.  Devaluing currency is an economic strategy often 
used by countries seeking to boost exports or foreign investment.  While advocates of the Euro 
argued that the removal of this option in the Eurozone would lead to more stable interest rates 
and macroeconomic trends, critics insisted that the inability to devalue the national currency 
could hurt nations that struggle economically in relation to their neighbors.   
Ultimately, the Euro came into effect in 1999 in 11 countries (Denmark, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom opted not to implement the Euro): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  Significantly, no contractual 
provisions were written for a country wanting to exit the Eurozone.  The Euro was not seen as an 
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experiment that could be scrapped if it did not accomplish its goals; rather, it was seen as a 
European economic and political project that understandably needed reevaluation and reform in 
the future (Juncker, Tusk, Dijsselbloem, Draghi & Schulz, 2014).   
After the Euro’s Implementation (1999-2009) 
Since no definitive criteria for success were set at the Euro’s inception, economists and 
politicians generally tend to analyze the Euro’s effects in relation to the goals in originally 
establishing the single currency.  Economic metrics such as Current Account Balances and 
Interest Rates have commonly been analyzed in order to judge the Euro’s impacts on the 
Eurozone economies (De Grauwe 2013; Hall 2014; Hope 2016).   
 The debate among economists and politicians as to the Euro being a beneficial economic 
implementation remains contentious.  Economists on both sides of the issue analyze economic 
data in varying ways in order to substantiate their view on the Euro.  Because the Euro is a union 
of economics and politics, it is important to contextualize economic data, as well as to factor in 
external and internal political movements when analyzing the Euro.  Many economic papers 
regarding the Euro fail to do so, opting instead to crunch raw data and present a conclusion based 
simply on econometrics.   
 Many economists have argued that the Euro has had a positive impact on the Eurozone 
economies.  One important argument for establishing the Euro was the supposed increase in 
trade flow among Eurozone countries.  Theoretically, the removal of the foreign exchange risk 
due to the Euro’s implementation and the benefits of the EU’s open borders would facilitate a 
larger volume of trade within the Eurozone.  Economic analysis done by Glick and Rose (2006) 
verifies this idea.  Glick and Rose have found that international trade between two economies is 
nearly twice as much when the two countries are part of the same currency unit versus when they 
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have separate currencies (Glick & Rose, 2016).  The Euro, along with a lack of foreign exchange 
risk, effective price comparison, and the advantages of a single market has proved to be effective 
in increasing trade volume within the Eurozone.  
 These findings are further substantiated by Mongelli and Vega (2006), who found that, 
“After the start of EMU, the [e]uro has already boosted intra-euro area trade by five to ten 
percent, and without trade diversion vis-à-vis the rest of the world (i.e., no ‘fortress Europe’)” 
(p.5).  The consideration of trade diversion is an important one because it contextualizes 
European trade within the broader scope of world trade.  Mongelli and Vega’s findings show that 
intra-European trade has increased independently from EU countries’ increase in global trade.  
 However, some economists remain skeptical of the Euro’s direct involvement in 
increasing trade flow within the Eurozone.  Critics of the Euro argue that when contextualizing 
European trade patterns, trade between European countries had been trending upwards over the 
course of the second half of the 20th century.  Furthermore, several key policy changes were 
made before the introduction of the Euro that boosted inter-European trade.  The result of these 
policies was closer European integration, and increased trade flow was the logical conclusion of 
nearly fifty years of increasingly closer economic ties (Berger & Nitsch, 2008). 
 In addition to an increase in trade volume, the Euro has had a substantial effect on 
Eurozone countries’ Current Account Balances.  A Current Account Balance is defined as the net 
of a country’s exports and imports.  If a country exports more than it imports, it is said to have a 
Current Account surplus.  Conversely, if a country imports more than it exports, it is said to have 
a Current Account deficit.  Generally, Current Account Balances correspond with a country’s 
fiscal policy in running either a surplus or a deficit.   
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 Since the Euro’s introduction, there has been a divergence in Current Account Balances 
within the Eurozone.  Varying fiscal policies contribute to this divergence, as each Eurozone 
member nation has autonomy in determining its own fiscal policy.  Critics’ worry that a singular 
monetary policy coupled with independent fiscal policy has been validated in that several 
Eurozone countries have run Current Account deficits for the majority of the Euro’s life (Regling 
et al., 2010).  In addition, the lack of ability to devalue currency to boost foreign investment 
(theoretically driving Current Account Balances upward) accelerates the deterioration of a 
country’s Current Account Balance.   
 According to research gathered by Hope (2016), in general, countries in the Southern 
Euro Area (SEA) have trended downward in terms of Current Account Balance, while countries 
in Northern Europe and Scandinavia have trended upward.  In particular, France, Greece, Italy, 
and Spain have seen a significant downward trend in Current Account Balances, while Germany 
and Austria have seen improvement.  A negative Current Account Balance can be problematic 
over time because it forces a country to run a budgetary deficit in order to compensate for the 
lack of revenue from exports.   
 Additionally, budgetary deficits and negative Current Account Balances can have a 
snowball effect from year to year.  A common strategy used to combat long-term negative 
Current Account Balances is the devaluation of currency to attract foreign investment, which, as 
previously mentioned, has been rendered a non-option by the Euro’s introduction.  Furthermore, 
SEA countries felt more comfortable running up Current Account and budgetary deficits after 
the introduction of the Euro because of the comfort and stability of being in an otherwise strong 
monetary union.  Because of this confidence in the Euro, SEA economies, since joining the 
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EMU, began to run higher deficits than their respective historical norms.   (Jaumotte & 
Sodsriwiboon, 2010).   
 The divergence in Current Account Balances between the SEA and the rest of the 
Eurozone corresponds to a divergence in fiscal policy as well.  As the SEA began to run deficits, 
countries like Germany and Austria began to run surpluses (Regling et al, 2010).  
The Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-2014) 
These fiscal divergences began to threaten the continued existence of the Euro during the 
global financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing Eurozone crisis of 2009.  Continued movement 
toward financial integration was always a large part of the Euro’s agenda, but the debt crisis that 
many Eurozone (particularly SEA) economies faced proved that the planned financial integration 
had not been quick enough.  The external, country-specific shocks that critics had long worried 
about began to strain the foundation of the Eurozone.   
 As Eurozone countries such as Spain, Italy and Portugal began to run the risk of 
defaulting on government debt, the Eurozone began to split on the issue of what caused the SEA 
Current Account deficits and the increased risk of SEA governments defaulting on debt.  
Germany, in particular, pointed toward the SEA’s fiscal irresponsibility in running up massive 
Current Account deficits.  Conversely, SEA countries pointed toward Germany’s insistence on 
low inflation rates and export-heavy tendencies as the reason why SEA economies could not 
compete enough to grow at a reasonable pace (Trautwein & Körner, 2014).  Again, the inability 
to devalue currency hurt the SEA economies, and Germany’s tendency to run a Current Account 
surplus meant that another country had to run a correlating Current Account deficit.   
 The Eurozone crisis illustrated many of the critiques of the Euro’s implementation, as 
well as the extremity of the Eurozone’s economic divergence.  Throughout the period during and 
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after the Eurozone crisis, critics of the Euro attacked the previous successes of the Euro, as well 
as the lack of foresight of European economic leaders.  A general consensus reached by the 
Euro’s supporters and critics alike was increased financial integration and fiscal structure was 
necessary in order to shield the Eurozone’s vulnerabilities and prevent another debt crisis.   
The Future of the Euro 
Although the Eurozone has stabilized since the Eurozone debt crisis, the call for reform is 
still prevalent among EMU nations (Juncker et al., 2014).  The economic divergence between 
Germany and the SEA continues to grow, and political tensions have arisen from economic 
disagreements on how to continue on with the Euro.  Since the Eurozone debt crisis, the question 
has been posed of whether or not the Eurozone would benefit by some members withdrawing.  
Additionally, the British referendum to leave the European Union established a sort of precedent 
for a EU member leaving the EU. 
 The future of the Eurozone is relatively uncertain, but European countries are pushing 
hard in order to improve the monetary union.  Because of the Euro’s benefits, and resulting tight-
knit economic integration of the Eurozone, getting rid of the Euro would be such a gargantuan 
economic and legal task, that no Eurozone country is seriously considering it.  Even one of the 
harshest critics of the Euro, a Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz, concludes that the Euro “can 
and must be saved” (Stiglitz, 2016).   
 The consensus among European economic leaders is that there must be a push toward 
increased financial integration.  Increased economic and financial integration would, 
theoretically, alleviate some of the economic divergence between Northern and Southern Europe, 
and stabilize economic metrics in the Eurozone such as Real Interest Rates (Lin & Yeh, 2016).   
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 While the leaders of the Eurozone are not pushing for such radical short-term reform, 
they agree that structural economic reform is needed.  As a result, the European Commission has 
put forth a 3-stage plan for “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union” (Juncker et 
al, 2014). The plan calls for establishing benchmarks for integration and a tiered approach on 
how to reach them.  Overall, the call for structural reform and economic integration within the 
Eurozone is widespread, and being readily enacted by Eurozone leaders.  
 Much of the literature surrounding the future of the Eurozone revolves around a 
particular economic metric, or centers around one country’s economic stability (or lack thereof).  
The goal of my thesis is to illustrate the Euro’s impacts on the Eurozone on a broad scale and use 
historic patterns in order to project the future of the Eurozone as a whole.  In particular, the 
question of whether or not it is reasonable to project that historical economic trends will continue 
within specific areas of the Eurozone is central to my thesis.  In theory, increased economic 
integration will lead to the Eurozone being less susceptible to external shocks, making it more 
likely that economic trends will continue in the short term.   
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     METHODOLOGY  
In order to approach the question of whether or not the Euro has had a positive impact on 
the original Eurozone countries, I have structured my research into two categories. The first 
category is comprised of primary raw data analysis.  The second category is comprised of 
secondary research, both qualitative and quantitative.   
I have decided to separate my research into these two buckets in order to gain a more 
holistic understanding of my research question.  The secondary research allows me to utilize 
economic data analysis that has already been performed, as well as find qualitative historical data 
that will help contextualize the economic analysis.  On the other hand, the primary research 
serves to illustrate several key economic trends and will supplement the secondary analysis that I 
find.  
Primary Research and Data Analysis 
In order to analyze the impact of the Euro on the original Eurozone, I have found 
economic data that pertains to the original 11 countries that implemented the Euro in 1999 - 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
and Spain.  Specifically, I examine macro-economic indicators such as: GDP, Current Account 
Balances, and bond yields within the Eurozone.  These indicators are standard macroeconomic 
measurements that allow for a holistic view of a nation’s overall economy.  Examining these 
indicators within the Eurozone allows for a big-picture examination of the Euro’s impacts. In 
order to make the data analysis as effective as it can be, I examine these indicators over a long 
period of time and look for patterns, as opposed to taking them as separate data points and 
comparing one to another.  
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GDP is one of the most commonly used indicators when looking at a nation’s economic 
health.  Therefore, GDP trends are an important consideration to make when analyzing the 
impact of a monetary union such as the EMU.   
Current Account Balances, simply, are the net sum of a country’s exports and imports.  
Since one of the main goals of the Euro’s implementation was to boost trade among the EMU, 
the analysis of Current Account Balances of Eurozone nations is critical in researching the 
effects of the Euro.  Furthermore, analyzing the historical trends of the Current Account 
Balances will serve to illustrate whether or not the Euro’s impacts (whether positive or negative) 
have been constant since its implementation.  
Finally, the bond yields of a particular country indicate the health and confidence of the 
government’s credit.  Higher bond yields typically indicate a riskier investment, with the 
government offering a higher yield in order to compensate for the increased risk.  Examining the 
bond yields of Eurozone nations over time will serve to illustrate how well or poorly individual 
governments are able to repay their debts and stave off financial instability.   
In order to set a historical context, I aim to limit my time horizon to 1992 to the present.  
My reasoning is that starting the time horizon at 1992 allows for almost a decade of historical 
context before the Euro’s implementation, and is the point at which most future Eurozone 
countries became the modern economic versions of themselves (particularly Germany with its 
1990 reunification).  
Secondary Qualitative and Quantitative research 
Since my research question is multi-faceted, numerous secondary sources from top 
economists that have analyzed the effects of the Euro’s implementation serve to bolster my 
analysis.  In my research, I have found that analysis of the Euro tends to focus on a particular 
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issue or geographic area, rather than attempting to tackle the question of its overall impact.  As a 
result, tying these sources together in conversation with one another, particularly when their 
conclusions conflict provides a more holistic view of the Euro’s impact. 
Similar to my primary research goals, when researching secondary economic analysis 
focus on macro-economic indicators and broad historical trends.  My reasoning is two-fold. First, 
since my research question is targeted at analyzing the impacts of the Euro on the entirety of the 
Eurozone, I believe looking at broader economic indicators are more effective in illustrating the 
progression of the Eurozone as a whole throughout the period since the Euro’s implementation.  
Secondly, I believe incorporating analysis that factors in historical trends is important because it 
contextualizes the analysis over the given time period and could explain certain patterns (or lack 
thereof) in the Eurozone’s economic trends. 
Since these secondary sources come from top economists, they are generally very 
detailed in their analysis of their particular topic.  For example, an economic paper covering the 
GDP growth of a particular Eurozone nation over time can dissect the actual GDP numbers down 
into their root causes, whether it be a lowering level of unemployment or increased trade flows 
with surrounding nations.  This analysis supplements my primary research and provide a deeper 
understanding of the economic trends that I have found.   
Additionally, research qualitative factors such as: shifts in political/economic ideology, 
government turnover, and cultural considerations.  I believe these qualitative factors serve to 
contextualize economic patterns, leading to a more holistic view of the Euro’s impacts, as 
opposed to presenting exclusively economic analysis.  For example, the high turnover rate of 
Prime Ministers in Italy over the last decade could have played a role in its economic instability.  
This consideration would be important when tackling my research question because the 
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argument could be made that economic instability – given the frequent change of governments – 
was inevitable, regardless of whether Italy implemented the Euro or retained the Lira.   
Overall, I aim to tie my own economic analysis and historical and cultural context with 
that of top economists in order to present a holistic view of the impact of the Euro on the 
Eurozone.  Through my research plenty of disagreement among economists and politicians as to 
whether or not the EMU has been a positive step or not.  Therefore, incorporating sources from 
both perspectives in conversation with one another and supplementing that conversation with my 
own research and perspective presents a broad view of the Euro’s economic impacts. 
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NORTHERN EUROZONE AREA (NEA) 
Northern Eurozone Area economies are centered around tight fiscal policy, high levels of 
wage coordination and restraint, and an export-led economic growth model (Hall, 2014; Hope, 
2016; Lane, 2012).  As the eleven nations that signed the Maastricht Treaty prepared to enter the 
European Monetary Union, Hall (2014) argues that NEA countries were particularly well-
positioned to benefit from the Euro because, “They could continue to pursue export-led growth 
strategies in a more favourable context in which their principal trading partners could no longer 
devalue in order to increase the competitiveness of their own products against those exports.”   
As will be discussed, after the Euro was implemented, the NEA countries saw a Current 
Account Balance increase, and began to run a continued surplus.  In particular, NEA countries 
benefited from the SEA’s lack of ability to devalue currency.  Additionally, tight wage 
coordination and restrained led to relatively lower labor costs, resulting in increased 
competitiveness with the SEA (Hall, 2014).  This led to a large flow of credit from the NEA 
countries to the SEA, allowing for constant budgetary surpluses and relatively low levels of debt 
within the NEA (Gros, 2012).   
When the debt levels and Current Account Deficits of the SEA eventually culminated in 
the Eurozone debt crisis, the NEA countries (particularly Germany) emerged as the main drivers 
of policy aimed at mitigating the debt crisis and preventing future crises. Consequently, the 
power dynamic in the Eurozone began to shift heavily in the NEA’s favor (Bulmer, 2014).  As a 
result, the implemented policies were heavily centered around bringing the SEA to a level of 
fiscal discipline similar to that of the NEA.  These policies did not have the desired effect, and 
the NEA continues to run Current Account and budgetary surpluses, resulting in a continually 
divergent Eurozone.   
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The NEA Pre-Euro Implementation (1992-1999) 
 After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the NEA countries, as a whole, had relatively 
balanced Current Accounts.  In fact, only two of the NEA countries (Belgium and Netherlands) 
ran Current Account Surpluses in the 1990s. This trend would later reverse, as the entire NEA 
would run a Current Account Surplus for a number of years in the 2000s.  However, before the 
implementation of the single currency, NEA Current Account Balances remained relatively 
balanced throughout the NEA.  Figure 4.1 shows the Current Account Balances of NEA 
countries from 1992-1999. 
 
Figure 4.1.  NEA Current Account Balances as Percent of GDP 1992-1999* 
Source: Knoema 
*Luxembourg not included because of a lack of available data 
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 Apart from Finland, no NEA country experienced a significant amount of fluctuation in 
its Current Account Balance, indicating that, for the most part, the period between the signing of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Euro’s implementation was business as usual.  
 In addition to stable trends in Current Accounts, the NEA also went through a period of 
fiscal tightening in the 1990s in preparation for the Euro’s launch.  Several NEA countries were 
well below the Maastricht Criterion of 3% government deficit in 1992, and began to implement 
stricter fiscal policies. Figure 4.2 shows the government surpluses/deficits of NEA countries 
from 1992-1999. 
Figure 4.2.  NEA Government Surplus/Deficit as Percent of GDP 1992-1999 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As seen in Figure 4.2, all six NEA nations were within the 3% deficit mark by 1997.  
Unlike the SEA, the Northern Eurozone Area’s fiscal tightening was complimented by 
increasing or stable Current Account Balances.  This correlation between increased fiscal 
discipline and stable Current Account Balances meant that the NEA was more prepared for the 
Euro’s implementation.  By 1999, all NEA countries had either met all five Maastricht criteria, 
or were judged as being on a reasonable path to attain them.   
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NEA Post-Euro implementation (1999-2009) 
 Once the Euro was launched in 1999, the NEA began to see the benefits of its entrance 
into the EMU.  Specifically, the lowered foreign exchange risk, focus on exports and restrained 
wage growth led the NEA to experience steady economic growth (Hall 2014; Hope 2016).  
Furthermore, the NEA, as a whole began to run substantial Current Account surpluses, along 
with increased credit flow to the Southern Eurozone nations (Gros, 2013).  These two factors set 
the stage for the economic divergence that would ultimately call the Eurozone’s existence into 
question in the late 2000s.  
 The NEA’s export led growth model and tight fiscal policies complimented the SEA’s 
demand-led growth model and looser fiscal policies.  After the Euro’s implementation, SEA 
growth was primarily driven by the credit that NEA countries were more than willing to provide 
(Gros, 2013; Holinski et al., 2012). As a result, the NEA was able to settle into its preferred 
economic pattern of Current Account and budgetary surpluses, while maintaining restrained 
wage growth in order to retain a competitive edge.  Figure 4.3 shows the Current Account 
Balances of the Northern Eurozone Area from 1999-2009. 
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Figure 4.3.  NEA Current Account Balance as Percent of GDP 1999-2009 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As shown in Figure 4.3, each of the NEA countries was running a Current Account 
Surplus by 2002, indicating that the NEA’s export-led economic model came into full fruition in 
the early 2000s.  When considered individually, a nation’s Current Account surplus can point to 
stable and sustainable economic growth.  Additionally, a continued Current Account surplus 
indicates a level of fiscal and economic discipline that can facilitate long-term economic and 
financial sustainability.   
 However, as Stiglitz (2016) points out, when a nation in a currency union runs a Current 
Account surplus, another nation must run a corresponding Current Account deficit. In the case of 
the Eurozone, the entirety of the NEA was running Current Account surpluses, meaning that the 
SEA was left with little choice but to run corresponding deficits.  Additionally, the NEA’s 
(particularly Germany’s) emphasis on high export levels and fiscal discipline allowed for little 
downward flexibility when it came to Current Account and budgetary surpluses.  As a result, the 
NEA systematically forced the SEA to run continued Current Account and budgetary deficits 
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(De Grauwe, 2013; Hall, 2014; Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon, 2013; Stiglitz, 2016).  For a more 
detailed discussion of Current Account Balance divergence, see Chapter 7. 
 Unlike the booming SEA, the NEA experienced slower but steadier growth during the 
period after the Euro’s implementation.  Figure 4.4 displays the annual percentage GDP growth 
of the NEA from 1999-2008 
Figure 4.4.  NEA Yearly Percentage GDP Growth 1999-2008 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As evident in Figure 4.4, apart from Luxembourg, no NEA country experienced 
explosive GDP growth during the period following the Euro’s implementation.  Hall (2014) 
argues that a lack of explosive growth in the NEA can be attributed to the tight fiscal policies 
implemented in the region.  By running budgetary and Current Account surpluses, NEA nations 
kept internal demand restrained.  Particularly in Germany, the emphasis on Stability Culture 
played a large role in keeping demand growth relatively low and exports relatively high.  For a 
more detailed discussion of Stability Culture, see Chapter 5.  Again, the Euro played a beneficial 
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role in the development of the NEA economies during this time period because it allowed the 
NEA to supply the demand growth of the SEA with its own credit and exports.   
 However, as discussed in Chapter 7, the divergence caused by the heterogeneity of the 
EMU economies and distinctly contrasting styles of the NEA and SEA culminated in the 
Eurozone debt crisis. 
 
NEA during the Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-2014) 
 Once the Eurozone debt crisis set in, the NEA was the only region of the two financially 
capable of putting forth the resources needed to save the whole Eurozone.  In particular, 
Germany led the charge from a resource and policy perspective.  In general, the rest of the NEA 
followed Germany’s lead in terms of backing policy proposals (Bulmer, 2014).  As a result, I 
discuss Germany’s approach toward the debt crisis in the Germany section, which can apply to 
the NEA policy approach as well.  
 
NEA Since the Eurozone Debt Crisis  
 A more detailed analysis of the NEA’s economic developments within the context of the 
Eurozone can be found in Chapter 7.  This section will focus on general economic development 
in the NEA since the debt crisis, as well as the level of public support for the Euro from the crisis 
up to the present time. 
As German-led policies were enacted in an effort to save the Eurozone, the entirety of the 
Eurozone suffered from the global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis.  In the NEA, the 
tempered economic growth slowed to a standstill amid concerns of the Eurozone’s continued 
existence. Figure 2.5 shows the NEA GDP percentage growth from 2008-2015 
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Figure 4.5.  NEA Annual Percentage GDP Growth 2008-2015 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
As seen in Figure 4.5, the global financial crisis and ensuing Eurozone crisis led to 
negative growth in the entirety of the NEA area from 2009-2010.  After that, unlike the SEA, the 
NEA was able to return to positive GDP growth because NEA nations did not require major 
economic policy changes like the SEA that caused short-term economic pain.  As a result, the 
NEA was able to pull out of the debt crisis and begin to trend toward positive yearly economic 
growth.   
Overall, the NEA was well-positioned to take advantage of the Euro’s implementation 
and did so.  The NEA saw steady growth during the first decade after the Euro was implemented, 
and was able to expand on its export-led growth model by allowing it to compliment the SEA’s 
willingness to increase demand.  However, the sustained Current Account Balance surpluses and 
willingness to provide credit to the SEA was a major factor in the Eurozone Debt Crisis. Once 
the crisis set in, the NEA was essentially tasked with pulling the Eurozone out of it, resulting in 
slowed economic growth as resources began to flow South in order to save the EMU. As a result, 
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the Euro hindered the NEA during that time period.  Since the crisis, the NEA has generally 
recovered, and remains the region in which public support for the Euro is stronger. 
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        GERMANY 
 
A founding member state of the Eurozone, Germany has emerged as the EMU’s strongest 
economy, and, therefore, maintains the most policy influence regarding the single currency.  
Overall, the Euro has benefited the German economically, and, arguably, politically.  The 
German economy has steadily grown since the Euro’s implementation due to increased trade 
flow and disciplined fiscal policy.  Additionally, Germany has become a European political 
powerhouse as a result of its economic standing.  As a result, Germany currently wields the most 
political and economic influence in the Eurozone (Bulmer, 2014; Howarth & Rommerskirchen, 
2013).  
However, Germany’s economic success has come at the expense of other Eurozone 
countries that have been unable to maintain the same level of steady growth or fiscal discipline.  
Moreover, the seemingly unwavering German insistence on the consistent monetary policy of 
low inflation leaves little flexibility for other Eurozone countries.  Germany’s considerable 
economic and political power within the Eurozone suggest that this preferred policy will not 
change any time soon, which I argue will lead to a perpetual economic tension between Germany 
and SEA countries. 
 Despite Germany benefiting from the Euro, and the current majority of German citizens 
supporting the continued use of the currency (Eurobarometer, 2016), there was initial public 
opposition to the implementation of the currency.  This opposition stemmed from a concept 
central to understanding German political and economic policy – the Stability Culture (Howarth 
& Rommerskirchen, 2013).  
 The idea of German Stability Culture is centered on low inflation rates, price stability, 
and steady economic growth.  Stability Culture also refers to a German cultural aversion to high 
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levels of debt and focus on fiscal responsibility.  Among the German public, low inflation was 
among the most important of policy goals, regardless of political party.  The term emerged in the 
early 1990s in reference to public opposition of the Euro.  Germans saw the move away from the 
Deutschmark as a potential inflation-inducing risk because of the integration with other 
European economies that were seen as less disciplined.  Moreover, the move toward the Euro 
meant the German government would relinquish control of the country’s monetary policy, and 
link its economy permanently to other European nations (Howarth & Rommerskirchen, 2013). 
Ultimately, as discussed in Chapter 3, the Maastricht Treaty was ratified despite the German 
public’s opposition.  
After the Euro was introduced, the term Stability Culture was politically pivoted to 
describe the Euro and the low inflation rates brought about by European economic integration.  
German politicians were able to successfully integrate the idea of the Euro with the continuation 
of the Stability Culture, and Germans began to believe that, “Germany was not surrendering its 
currency culture, but rather exporting it throughout the Eurozone” (Howarth & Rommerskirchen, 
2013). Howarth and Rommerskirchen conclude that, presently, inflation aversion (Stability 
Culture) remains a top priority for German voters, regardless of political party or demographic.  
Because of this insistence of stability, it is safe to assume that regardless of which political party 
is in power in Germany, the insistence of Stability Culture will remain strong as ever.  Voters’ 
preference for this economic tendency will ensure that Germany’s economic policy will reflect 
its desire to maintain the Stability Culture.  
 To this point, the German desire for low inflation rates has largely been fulfilled, and the 
German economy has been able to maintain some level of predictability.  As a result, popular 
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support for the Euro has increased in the last decade.  Currently, 61% of the German population 
believes the Euro is beneficial to Germany (Eurobarometer, 2016).   
 
Germany’s Role in Establishing the Euro (1992-1999) 
As one of Europe’s strongest economies at the time, Germany played an integral role in 
the foundation and implementation of the Euro.  Helmut Kohl, Germany’s chancellor at the time, 
was one of the primary champions of the Euro.  The motivation for establishing the EMU, 
however, was not purely economic.  De Grauwe (2013) argues that, “the ultimate objective was 
to permanently link the fates of Germany and France and thereby make future wars in Europe 
impossible.”  If the ultimate objective was, in fact, political, it is not unreasonable to assume that 
economic shortcomings were overlooked in order to push the Maastricht Treaty through.  
Moreover, Kohl faced significant opposition from the German population, who were reluctant to 
trade in the stability and independence of the Deutschmark for the untested Euro (De Grauwe, 
2013).   
European economic integration was a longstanding goal before the introduction of the 
Euro through the European Monetary System (EMS), in which European currencies were linked 
in a system of currency pegging.  In the EMS, Germans viewed Stability Culture as a political, 
economic, and culture fixture.  The fate of Germany’s economy was in the hands of Germans, 
even though the EMS pushed for continuing integration. 
Furthermore, with Germany being one of Europe’s strongest economies, the country 
essentially led the system of currency pegging, with other European nations choosing to peg their 
currency to the Deutschmark.  As a result, monetary policy enacted by the German central bank 
(Bundesbank) dictated other European nations’ monetary policy.  Thus, Germany became the de 
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facto economic leader of Europe leading up to the Maastricht treaty (De Grauwe 2013).  Because 
the German economy was at the forefront of European economic policy and maintained 
monetary and fiscal autonomy, “with the [Deutschmark] as the anchor of the system, the 
asymmetrical nature of the EMS therefore did not challenge German stability culture” (Bulmer, 
2014).  The move toward the Euro meant giving up the leading role in the European economic 
system in exchange for an equal seat at the table with other European nations that were not as 
economically disciplined as Germany.  As a result, the Germans heavily influenced conditions 
for the founding of the EMU. 
In particular, the central values of the Stability Culture were implemented in the EMU.  
This entailed keeping inflation levels low and maintaining price stability – a policy identical to 
the traditional monetary policy of the Bundesbank (Bulmer, 2014).  Furthermore, Germans 
sought to depoliticize the common monetary policy in order to ensure an objective structure that 
would be better suited to achieve its Stability Culture goals (Enderlein, Gnath & Haas, 2016).  
As one of Europe’s strongest economies at the time, Germany was in a strong position to 
satisfy the criteria at the time of the Euro’s implementation in 1999.  Therefore, the German 
financial and economic house was in order, and was ready to undertake the implementation of 
the Euro.  German readiness for the Euro stood in stark contrast to other European nations, such 
as Italy, who were not as economically prepared for the Euro, and did not satisfy the Maastricht 
criteria.  As a result, the path toward divergence was set, and the Germans held the economic 
upper hand because of the nation’s higher level of fiscal organization.  
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After the Euro’s Implementation (1999-2009) 
As the Euro came into circulation in the Eurozone, Germany continued its economic and 
monetary policy trends of low inflation and price stability.  Politicians such as Angela Merkel 
and her CDU party began to use the term Stability Culture in reference to the Euro and the pan-
European stability it facilitated (Howarth & Rommerskirchen 2011).   As a result, German public 
support for the Euro steadily increased, and Merkel, a champion of the Euro, has remained in 
power since 2005.   
Furthermore, Germany began to run a Current Account Balance surplus, with the first net 
positive Current Account Balance coming in 2002 (Federal Reserve Bank St. Louis).  As fiscal 
and budgetary conservatism continued to dominate German policy, the nation began running 
Current Account Balance surpluses every year since.  Figure 5.1 shows Germany’s Current 
Account Balance since 1999. 
 
Figure 5.1. German Current Account Balance 1999-2013 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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Account Balance surpluses by being in a better economic position than other Eurozone countries.  
For example, the population in Germany is the highest among the Eurozone nations, and its unit 
labor cost the lowest in the Eurozone (Bulmer, 2014).   
Economic advantages such as low unit labor cost and a large labor force coupled with the 
Euro’s removal of foreign exchange risk and trade barriers served to significantly benefit 
Germany’s economic growth since the introduction of the Euro.   Additionally, institutionalized 
strategies and economic mindsets have proved imperative in Germany’s ability to significantly 
boost exports (and, therefore, Current Account Balances).  Such strategies include: “central bank 
independence and monetary policy, universal banking with long-term engagement in industries, 
and openness to international trade” (Trautwein & Korner, 2014). 
Central bank independence and monetary policy ensure that, barring a major shift in 
economic mindset or circumstance, monetary policy would remain fairly consistent.  
Additionally, the German economic model is centered around minimal government interference 
(Bulmer, 2014). Coupled with Germans’ emphasis on low inflation and price stability, the 
German central bank has maintained a steady policy in line with the idea of the Stability Culture.   
The policy of low inflation rates and price stability also contributed heavily to Germany’s 
increasing net Current Account Balance.  Analysis done by Björksten and Syrjänen (2000) shows 
that the ideal rise in interest rates for Germany would be significantly less than that of other 
Eurozone countries such as Portugal and Ireland, and less than the weighted average of the entire 
Eurozone’s output. The analysis is based on the Taylor rule, a reduced-form equation used to 
determine the ideal percentage interest rate increase for every percent increase in inflation.  
 Björksten and Syrjänen (2000) show that Germany’s optimal interest rate increase for 
every percentage inflationary increase would be 1.4, as compared to other Eurozone nations such 
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as Portugal (4.9) and Spain (4.6).  Factoring in weighted averages of GDP, the optimal Taylor 
Rule interest rate for the Eurozone in 2000 would have been 2.4. 
This difference optimal interest rate hikes illustrates a clear divergence in optimal 
monetary policy.  In other words, a one-size-fits-all approach would be detrimental to several 
Eurozone economies’ long-term growth.  For example, a higher optimal interest rate indicates 
that taking on debt should become more expensive, thus disincentivizing a nation from doing so.   
However, in the Eurozone, there is a singular monetary policy, and therefore a singular 
interest rate that was lower than optimal for several Eurozone nations.  As a result, nations such 
as Spain and Portugal were incentivized to take on relatively cheap debt (that they otherwise 
probably would not have) in order to spur short-term economic growth.  Conversely, Germany’s 
optimal interest rate fell below the Eurozone’s, therefore making excessive borrowing 
unattractive, leading to budgetary and Current Account surpluses.  
Germany’s export-minded economy was further boosted by the increased trade flow 
resulting in the Euro’s implementation.  Empirical analysis performed by Micco et al. (2003) 
suggests that the impact of the single currency boosted trade among Eurozone members by a 
statistically significant range of 7-10%.  This increased trade flow benefited Germany in 
particular, both in the short and long terms.  In the short term, the Euro’s removal of trade risks 
and barriers, coupled with German economic advantages such as low unit labor costs, quickly 
increased German Current Account Balances and GDP.  In the long run, German social and 
political insistence on fiscal discipline set the country on a course of increased economic growth.  
As a result, the German economy retained its position at the forefront of the Eurozone. 
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Germany’s Policies Set Path to Divergence 
However, there are many who argue that Germany’s insistence on this particular 
economic model was a key factor in the development of the Euro crisis.  For example, Dulien 
and Guerot (2012) argue that German economic and political policies in the years leading up to 
the Eurozone crisis were almost exclusively focused inward, resulting in a lack of timely 
economic integration; “from a German point of view, no co-ordination [was] needed as long as 
everyone has the correct policies.”  In other words, German policy in the 2000s largely ignored 
the increasing divergence in the Eurozone, and believed that institutional safeguards such as the 
Stability and Growth Pact would ensure that divergence would be restrained to a manageable 
level.  Increasing divergence would therefore be seen as a nation’s lack of discipline in following 
the Stability and Growth Pact (Hall, 2014).  
Furthermore, Enderlein et al. (2016) argue that, “Germany’s original idea of stability was 
too narrow for the monetary union.”  The one-size-fits-all monetary policy of the ECB benefited 
Germany in particular, but ended up hindering competitiveness of other Eurozone countries.  The 
original German effort to de-politicize the ECB and its policies ensured that the Eurozone’s 
monetary policy remained fairly constant, and immune to the pressures of struggling economies’ 
political and economic leaders.  
The divergence between Germany and other key Eurozone nations is particularly clear in 
the widening gap between Current Account Balances.  Figure 5.2 shows the Current Account 
Balances of Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal.   
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Figure 5.2. Current Account Balances in Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain 1999-2008 
  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As seen in Figure 5.2, Germany’s consistent Current Account surplus (and corresponding 
budgetary surplus) meant that other Eurozone countries had to run corresponding Current 
Account (and budgetary) deficits.  Over time, these deficits added on growing debt levels and 
reduced competitiveness for Southern Euro Areas.  Coupled with Germany’s insistence on an 
export-led economic system, the divergence in Current Account Balances was essentially 
inevitable. 
 Throughout the early 2000s, Germany experienced steady economic growth due to the 
Euro’s implementation because of its emphasis on Stability Culture, export-minded economic 
system, and fiscal discipline.  However, these strategies also began to set Germany on a course 
of divergence with other Eurozone countries that were conversely taking on relatively cheap debt 
in order to boost short-term economic growth.  In the years leading up to the global financial and 
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Eurozone debt crises, this divergence played a key role in establishing Germany’s current 
position among Eurozone economies.  
 
Germany in the Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-2014) 
Because of Germany’s economic strength and influence on the ECB, it emerged as the de 
facto head of the effort to save the Euro, and dictated many of the resulting conditions (Bulmer, 
2014).  This ascension to the lead role was the result of the strength of Germany’s economic 
model, as well as the large amount of credit German banks had issued other Eurozone 
institutions in the years leading up to the Euro crisis (Morisse-Schilbach, 2011).  Furthermore, 
German shares of the ECB total 27%, more than any other Eurozone nation (Schild, 2013).  
This economic leadership did not always result in proactivity, or even immediate 
reaction.  Additionally, as an equal member of the Eurozone, Germany did not have unilateral 
authority to enact its proposed remedies to the Euro crisis.  Other EMU nations such as France 
pushed their economic agenda as well, leading to both political and economic standoffs between 
Germany and other Eurozone nations. German culture places emphasis on careful dialogue 
preceding policy decisions and a relatively even balance of power (Bohn & de Jong, 2011).  As a 
result, Germany’s longtime Chancellor, Angela Merkel, avoided rash action during the crisis in 
favor of a more cautious approach.  
Regardless, as the leader of the decision-making process, Germany maintained its 
traditional economic view and the Germans applied it to their view of the crisis.  Furthermore, 
“…the German mainstream [saw] current account imbalances in the [E]urozone as a 
consequence of a loss of competitiveness and excessive consumption in the deficit countries...” 
(Dullien & Guerot, 2011).  In the eyes of many Germans, the debt crisis was the result of 
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undisciplined fiscal policy in Southern Eurozone countries, and the only remedy was to impose a 
system of fiscal discipline analogous to the German system of Stability Culture (Bulmer, 2014).  
Consequently, Germany pushed for a solution to the crisis that involved the necessary 
bailouts of nations about to crack under the weight of their debt in exchange for strict austerity 
measures.  The austerity measures would, theoretically, ensure that the countries receiving the 
financial aid would be set on a path toward fiscal discipline, and thus be less likely to find 
themselves in the same position in the future (Truger, 2013).  The German push for austerity 
measures (the effects of which are hotly debated among economists and politicians) is 
unsurprising given the Germans’ historic emphasis on financial discipline.  Although Germany 
did not have unilateral decision making power, it carried a lot of weight, and was able to enact a 
lot of its desired policy points.  
Given Germany’s superior economic position, it, along with France, often reached 
compromises in the nick of time, and pulled other nations into a sort of coalition in order to 
approve the agreed-upon deal (JovAnovic & Damnjanovic, 2013).  This manner of political 
leadership often frustrated other Eurozone leaders.  For example, in 2010, Italy’s Foreign 
Minister, Franco Frattini, referred to these kinds of deals as “pre-cooked decisions” (Dinmore, 
2010).  
 Unsurprisingly, the German desired economic remedy to the crisis contrasted 
significantly with other Eurozone nations, most notably France.  As a result, the Eurozone crisis 
had a lack of a definitively agreed-upon structure by which ailing countries can begin to close the 
economic gap.  Instead, last-second arrangements were generally made as the result of a Franco-
German compromise and the ensuing process of hastily bringing other Eurozone members on 
board in a take-it-or-leave it fashion (Schild, 2013).   Irrespective of the seeming exclusivity of 
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the policy process during the debt crisis, however, the bailout of struggling Eurozone nations 
showed a German willingness and determination to keep the Euro alive. 
Additionally, Germany further ingrained its fiscal responsibility on a domestic level by 
instituting a constitutional Schuldenbremse, or Debt Brake in 2009. This constitutional 
amendment stipulates that, starting in 2016, there would be a federal borrowing cap of 0.35% of 
GDP (Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013).  The Debt Brake serves as a sort of doubling-down 
on fiscal discipline, and, since it is a constitutional amendment, will likely remain in place for the 
foreseeable future. 
Germany Since the Debt (2014-present) 
The German economic mindset has changed little since the implementation of the Euro.  
Given how ingrained this mindset is in the German public, it is unlikely that future German 
economic policy will differ greatly from its historical trend.  Unfortunately for some of the other 
Eurozone countries, particularly those in the south, this consistent policy will likely mean 
continuing economic hardship.  Because of German insistence on running Current Account and 
budgetary surpluses, and the self-imposed Debt Brake, Southern European countries will 
continue to be externally pushed toward running Current Account deficits.  Without the ability to 
devalue the local currency, Southern Eurozone Area nations will continue to lack price 
competitiveness, meaning almost certain short-term economic hardship.   
However, overall, the German determination to keep the Euro afloat has meant taking 
action that went against the prevailing German economic mindset of minimal government 
interference (both fiscal and monetary) in the economy (Dullien & Guerot, 2013).  Also, the 
Eurozone appears to have pulled out of the deepest depths of the Euro crisis, indicating that the 
German-led policies were sufficient to keep the Euro alive.  Already proving willing and capable 
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to prevent the Euro from failing, Germany will likely continue to pursue a path of steady 
European integration.  However, the Germans will continue to insist that this path of integration 
remain in line with the staple German economic tenants of fiscal responsibility, as evidenced by 
the push for austerity.   
As a result, the Euro will continue to survive, but will most likely continue to experience 
a wide range of diversion between the Eurozone economies.  Since all signs point to Germany 
being set in its ways economically, struggling Eurozone countries will find it difficult to close 
the gap without traditional strategies such as currency devaluation.  Germany’s continued 
Current Account surpluses, Debt Brake and cultural insistence on a tight fiscal policy will mean 
other Eurozone nations will continue to endure the same relative economic disadvantages as they 
have since the Euro’s implementation. 
Finally, Germany’s continued position at the forefront of European policy making and its 
role as the Eurozone’s chief creditor will mean that Eurozone policy will also likely change very 
little in the short-term.  The only instance in which Germany would lose its leadership in 
Eurozone policy making (barring a widespread financial emergency) would be one in which a 
coalition of economically like-minded Eurozone nations emerges in a unified manner with a 
clear vision of how the Eurozone should be best integrated.  Given that several northern 
Eurozone countries share similar economic values with Germany, such a coalition is unlikely, 
and the Eurozone will likely continue to be sluggishly integrated. 
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SOUTHERN EUROZONE AREA 
As previously mentioned, I have defined the Southern Eurozone Area (SEA) as: Italy, 
Spain and Portugal.  In general, SEA countries have relatively limited power in coordinating 
wage growth, have a low emphasis on training the workforce (and therefore rely heavily on 
unskilled labor), and have generally loose fiscal policies (Hall 2014). The reliance on unskilled 
labor and low coordination of wage growth has led to a lack of competitiveness with the 
Northern Eurozone Area (Hall, 2014; Hassel, 2014).  As will be discussed, the low levels of 
wage restraint led to a decreasing level of competitiveness (Hassel, 2014).  Because of a lack of 
sustainable competitiveness with the NEA, the SEA economies are centered around demand-
driven growth (i.e. high levels of imports) (Hall, 2014).   
In the years before the Euro’s implementation, SEA countries made an economic push to 
satisfy the Maastricht Criteria.  By 1999, the three SEA nations had satisfied 4 of 5 criteria, and 
were deemed to be sufficiently on the way to satisfying the fifth.  However, the satisfaction of 
the majority of the Maastricht Criteria did not necessarily mean that the SEA was prepared to 
enter the EMU.  In particular, the national debt levels of the SEA nations were substantially 
higher than the 60% requirement, and would continue to grow after the Euro’s implementation, 
eventually leading to the Eurozone debt crisis.   
In the short-term, the SEA economies’ demand-driven growth complimented the NEA 
economies’ export-led growth models.  Additionally, membership in the single currency union 
meant a singular interest rate that was lower than it would have been had the SEA nations 
remained independent.  Lower interest rates made borrowing more attractive for SEA nations 
(Björksten & Syrjänen, 2000).  Lowered transaction costs and the removal of foreign exchange 
risk helped to facilitate trade, with a heavy increase of imports.   
 40 
As a result, SEA Current Account Balances (and budgets) began to deteriorate and 
diverge significantly from the NEA (Hope, 2016).  In the long-term, this meant an unsustainable 
level of debt in the SEA and culminated in the Eurozone debt crisis.  Because of the 
economically weak position of Southern Eurozone nations, they had little opportunity to 
influence the Eurozone policy decisions that sought to pull the EMU out of the crisis.  In order to 
receive the necessary financial assistance from the rest of the EMU, the SEA was forced to 
implement austerity measures that pushed their economies into a recession.  
The result has been declining public support for the Euro in the SEA countries and 
sluggish economic growth because of the austerity measures.  In the short-term, the SEA will 
likely continue to experience sluggish growth, in addition to a growing debate within nations 
about continued membership in the EMU.  
The SEA Pre-Euro Implementation (1992-1999) 
 Before the Euro’s implementation, the SEA countries experienced two economic trends 
that began to trend in the opposite direction after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and before 
the Euro went into effect in 1999 – Current Account balances relatively close to zero and high 
budgetary deficits.  
 Once the Maastricht Criteria was implemented, the SEA economies began to reduce their 
budgetary deficits in preparation for the Euro’s implementation.  Theoretically, lower fiscal 
deficits should serve to improve Current Account Balances.  Additionally, interest rates in the 
SEA began to decline, giving SEA governments access to cheaper debt than they had before 
(Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon, 2010).   
The ultimate goal of this fiscal tightening was the Maastricht Criterion of less than a 3% 
deficit by 1999.  All three SEA countries were able to achieve this target goal by the time the 
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Euro was implemented.  Theoretically, this fiscal tightening signaled that the SEA countries 
were able to get their financial houses in order, and would be able to maintain an acceptable 
fiscal budget. 
However, the fiscal budgetary improvements in the SEA in the lead up to the Euro’s 
implementation were not necessarily beneficial to the SEA’s long-term economic health.  As 
confidence in the EMU began to drive down interest rates, SEA countries gained access to 
cheaper credit, and were able to fuel their demand-driven growth.  As a result, prices and unit 
labor costs in the SEA countries began to increase significantly.  As unit labor costs increase 
across the board, a nation begins to lose its competitiveness with its trading partners, because its 
products cost more to make.  Because the competitiveness of SEA economies was driven 
significantly by low-cost labor, the rising unit labor costs began to take a toll on SEA 
competitiveness.  The area most affected by the decreased competitiveness was the Current 
Account Balance of SEA nations (Hall, 2014).   
Countries not sharing a single currency normally combat decreased competitiveness and 
rising Current Account Balances by devaluing their currency in order to make their products 
relatively cheaper (Regling et al., 2010).  However, because of their coming entrance into the 
Eurozone and the Maastricht Criterion forbidding currency devaluation, SEA countries were 
unable to devalue their national currency.  As a result, SEA Current Account Balances began 
trending downward in the mid-1990s.  Figure 6.1 shows the Current Account Balances for the 
SEA area from 1990-1999. 
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Figure 6.1. SEA Current Account Balances as Percent of GDP 1990-1999 
Source: World Bank 
 
As seen in Figure 6.1, SEA Current Account Balances began to rapidly deteriorate in the 
mid 1990s in the lead up to the Euro’s implementation.  This trend would remain constant 
throughout the Euro’s lifetime, as SEA countries ran Current Account Balance deficits that 
corresponded with the NEA’s Current Account surpluses.  Although the SEA’s fiscal deficits 
were moving toward zero, the Current Accounts were decreasing, signaling that the SEA was not 
as well-prepared for the Euro as it might have seemed. 
 As mentioned, once the Maastricht was signed, interest rates in the SEA began to fall.  
Figure 6.2. depicts the long-term government bond yields of the SEA nations. 
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Figure 6.2. Italy, Spain and Portugal 1992-1999 Long-Term Bond Yields 1992-1999 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As seen in Figure 6.2, bond rates in the SEA dropped significantly in the mid-1990s, 
allowing for the governments in those nations to issue cheaper debt.  The issuance of cheaper 
debt by SEA countries further contributed to the increasing Current Account deficit. Kosteletou 
(2012) finds that a sudden increase or decrease in interest rates will have a deteriorating effect on 
Current Account Balances.  As shown in Figure 6.2, interest rates in the SEA quickly dropped 
after 1995, leading to a negative effect on SEA Current Account Balances.  Intuitively, as credit 
becomes cheaper, a nation is incentivized to borrow more.  In the demand-led growth model of 
the SEA, this increased credit was spent to drive demand up, resulting in a higher level of 
imports, and thus a deteriorating Current Account Balance. 
Furthermore, Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010) point out that SEA countries began to 
finance their Current Accounts with debt instead of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  In other 
words, SEA economic growth in the lead up to the Euro’s implementation was fueled 
significantly by increased leverage instead of sustainable economic and financial practice.   
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SEA After the Euro’s Implementation (1999-2009) 
 Once the Euro was implemented, the economic trends from the mid-1990s continued.  
SEA Current Account Balances continued to diverge from the NEA, and SEA national debt 
continued to increase.  However, the GDP of SEA nations began to increase as the result of the 
increased trade flow and removal of foreign exchange risk within the Eurozone.  Figure 6.3 
shows the GDP percentage growth from 1999-2008. 
 
Figure 6.3. Italy, Spain and Portugal Percent Change in GDP 1999-2008 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As shown in Figure 6.3, SEA countries’ GDPs increased significantly after the Euro was 
implemented in 1999 (with the exception of an economic contraction in Spain and Portugal in 
2000).  Key advantages of the Euro such as: removal of foreign exchange risk, the European 
single market, and stable interest rates led to short-term economic growth (Regling et al., 2010).   
 Thus, in terms of short-term economic growth, the Euro was beneficial to the SEA 
countries once it was originally implemented.  As will be discussed, the increased trade flow the 
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Euro brought about benefited SEA economies.  Had the Euro not been implemented, it is 
doubtful that SEA economies would have seen such an increase in growth (Baldwin, 2006).   
 However, amid the economic growth, underlying economic problems in the SEA began 
to grow.  In particular, SEA countries’ competitiveness relative to their northern neighbors did 
not increase (Hall, 2014).  As Hassel points out, loss of competitiveness in SEA countries put 
pressure to increase compensation for labor.  Increased compensation would, in turn, lower 
competitiveness because of a higher unit labor cost.  In a single currency union, lowered 
competiveness is an acute problem because of the lack of the most effective tool to combat a loss 
in competitiveness – the ability to devalue currency (Regling et al., 2010).   
 Thus, after the Euro’s implementation, the SEA’s lack of competitiveness in relation to 
the NEA began to grow (Hassel, 2014).  Without the ability to devalue the currency, and with the 
NEA’s trend of running Current Account Surpluses, it is no surprise that the SEA’s Current 
Account Balance began to deteriorate at an increasing rate once the Euro was implemented. 
 Deteriorating Current Account Balances and a widening gap in competitiveness with the 
NEA set the stage for economic hardship in the SEA once the global financial and Eurozone 
crises set in.  As Hope (2016) concludes, the EMU played an integral role in the SEA’s Current 
Account Balance deterioration, and SEA Current Accounts would not have decreased at such a 
pace if the Euro had not been implemented.  Furthermore, without the ability to devalue 
currency, the SEA countries had little choice but to continue to finance their economic growth 
with leverage (Jaumotte & Sodsriwiboon, 2010).  The result of the growing divergence in 
Current Account Balances and growing debt in the SEA was the Eurozone debt crisis, during 
which SEA countries required assistance from the rest of the Eurozone in order to economically 
stay afloat (Hassel, 2014).   
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The SEA During the Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-2014) 
 After the global financial crisis of 2008, the Eurozone (particularly the SEA) endured an 
ensuing financial shock as investors lost confidence in the SEA countries’ ability to repay their 
debts.  Apart from economic downturn, the SEA also experienced political turmoil, as sudden 
shifts in government took place (Hassel, 2014). In Italy, then-Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi 
resigned.  In Portugal and Spain, both incumbent Prime Ministers were defeated in elections.  
The ousting of incumbent governments indicated that the SEA public lost faith in their 
governments’ ability to deal with the crisis, and incumbents were replaced with new coalitions 
tasked with pulling their nations out of the Eurozone crisis. 
 As Bosco and Verney (2012) point out, SEA politicians were put in a particularly 
difficult situation in having to deal with both Eurozone leaders (many of whom saw the SEA as 
primarily responsible for the debt crisis), and their respective electorates that wanted a solution 
that would be least painful for their own countries.  Consequently, SEA leaders were caught 
between working with other Eurozone leaders in a lopsided power dynamic (which would be 
unpopular with their electorate) or making a more unrealistic push to get a better deal for their 
country (which would make them seem less credible to other Eurozone leaders).  Ultimately, 
SEA governments turned toward the latter option, and began to implement austerity measures in 
an effort to mitigate the effects of the debt crisis. 
 In Portugal, these austerity measures were particularly difficult because they 
compounded with the already weak growth of the Portuguese economy. From 2008-2011, the 
Portuguese economy experienced only one year of positive growth, and ran a budgetary deficit 
much higher than the 3% required by the Stability and Growth Pact (Bosco & Verney 2012).  By 
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the time the Portuguese government received a bailout in 2011, the budgetary deficit stood at -
11.2 percent of GDP (Eurostat, 2016).  In exchange for the 2011 bailout package, Portugal was 
forced to implement austerity measures, which further slowed down economic growth.  Bosco 
and Verney (2012) point out that, unlike Portugal, Italy and Spain did not require a bailout 
packages, but were nonetheless hit hard by the Eurozone debt crisis.  In Italy, a decade of loose 
fiscal policy and relatively slow growth resulted in speculative attacks on Italian bonds after an 
overall loss of investor confidence in the Southern Euro Area.  High levels of existing 
government debt and low growth patterns made Italy a prime target for a lack of investor 
confidence.  Furthermore, as the increase in bond spreads rose along with the government debt 
and deficit, increased government spending to pull the economy out of the Eurozone crisis was 
rendered a non-option.  In Spain, a 2008 housing bubble burst and the effects of a global 
financial crisis sent the economy into a downward spiral.  GDP growth and budgetary surpluses 
were replaced with negative growth and budgetary deficits.  Notably, the unemployment rate 
among Spanish workers under 25 years old reached almost 50% in 2011. 
Table 6.1.  
SEA Real GDP Growth, Government Surplus (Deficit) and Government Debt 2008-2012 
 
Portugal 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real GDP 
Growth 
(Decline) as 
a % 
0.2 (3.0) 1.9 (1.8) (4.0) 
Government 
Surplus 
(Deficit) as 
% of GDP 
(3.8) (9.8) (11.2) (7.4) (5.7) 
Government 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
71.7 83.6 96.2 111.4 126.2 
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Italy 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real GDP 
Growth 
(Decline) as 
a % 
(1.1) (5.5) 1.7 0.6 (2.8) 
Government 
Surplus 
(Deficit) as 
% of GDP 
(2.7) (5.3) (4.2) (3.7) (2.9) 
Government 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
102.4 112.5 115.4 116.5 123.3 
 
Spain 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real GDP 
Growth 
(Decline) as 
a % 
1.1 (3.6) 0.0 (1.0) (2.9) 
Government 
Surplus 
(Deficit) as 
% of GDP 
(3.8) (9.8) (11.2) (7.4) (5.7) 
Government 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
39.4 52.7 60.1 69.5 85.7 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As seen from Table 6.1, all SEA countries experienced a sharp decline in Real GDP, 
along with a surge in government debt and deficit during the debt crisis.  Austerity programs 
implemented in the SEA countries during the crisis also served to reduce economic growth as 
government debt levels rose.  As De Grauwe (2013) argues, there is little evidence to suggest 
that austerity benefited SEA countries in any way, and severely limited SEA economic growth 
amid growing government debt. In the years following the most extreme points of the debt crisis 
(2014-present) the SEA has continued to struggle economically and politically, resulting in 
decreasing public support for the Euro. 
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The SEA Since the Debt Crisis (2014-Present) 
 As discussed in Chapter 7, several policy decisions were implemented by the Eurozone in 
order to pull the EMU out of the debt crisis.  The majority of these policies were aimed at 
providing immediate financial aid to SEA countries under the condition that the SEA countries 
repay their debt and implement programs geared toward swift fiscal consolidation.  As a result, 
public support for the Euro in the SEA has fallen considerably after the debt crisis.  Not 
surprisingly, austerity programs implemented in the SEA led to economic downturn, much to the 
frustration of the populations living in SEA nations.  Table 5.2 shows key economic indicators 
for the SEA during and after the debt crisis 
 
Table 6.2. 
 
SEA Real GDP Growth, Government Surplus (Deficit) and Government Debt 2012-2015 
 
Portugal 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP 
Growth 
(Decline) as 
a % 
(4.0) (1.1) 0.9 1.6 
Government 
Surplus 
(Deficit) as 
% of GDP 
(7.4) (5.7) (4.8) (7.2) 
Government 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
126.2 129.0 130.6 129.0 
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Italy 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP 
Growth 
(Decline) as 
a % 
(2.8) (1.7) 0.1 0.7 
Government 
Surplus 
(Deficit) as 
% of GDP 
(2.9) (2.7) (3.0) (2.6) 
Government 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
123.3 129.0 131.9 132.3 
 
Spain 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Real GDP 
Growth 
(Decline) as 
a % 
(2.9) (1.7) 1.4 3.2 
Government 
Surplus 
(Deficit) as 
% of GDP 
(10.5) (7.0) (6.0) (5.1) 
Government 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
85.7 95.4 100.4 99.8 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As seen in table 6.2, sluggish (at times negative) GDP growth, high deficits and 
increasing debt levels continued in Southern Europe after the debt crisis was over.  After 
austerity measures were implemented in the SEA, Lane (2012) and De Grauwe (2013) argued 
that austerity measures would only add to the government debt, while keeping economic growth 
to a minimal level.  Table 6.2 provides affirmative evidence of their predictions. All three SEA 
countries have seen their government debt levels increase far above the mandated level of 60%.   
Perhaps the hardest hit economy in terms of government debt increase has been Spain.  
Before the Eurozone debt crisis, the Spanish government maintained a debt level under 60%.  
After the onset of the crisis, and in the years following, the Spanish debt-to-GDP ratio has 
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increased significantly as the result of austerity measures and continued lack of competitiveness 
with the rest of the Eurozone.  
 Moreover, the economic turmoil during the debt crisis has facilitated a political shift in 
Southern Europe toward parties that oppose austerity reforms (Hall, 2014).  Frequent 
government turnover (particularly in Italy) has led to growing instability within the SEA as 
individual countries have yet to form a definitive political and economic long-term plan to deal 
with sluggish growth.  Thus, the SEA is caught between an increasing number of voters who are 
Eurosceptic, and the political elite of the Eurozone calling for increased financial and political 
integration.   
In the years after the debt crisis, continued membership in the EMU has had significant 
economic and political drawbacks to the Southern Eurozone Area.  A decade’s worth of inflating 
debt levels and deteriorating Current Account Balances left the SEA in a particularly vulnerable 
position once the global and Eurozone financial crises hit.  The austerity measures that the SEA 
was forced to impose in order to pull out of the crisis only served to further hamstring economic 
growth.  As a result, the SEA public support for the Euro has dropped in some cases to below 
50%, indicating that the majority of the electorate is no longer under the impression that the Euro 
has been beneficial to their nation (European Commission, 2016). 
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THE EUROZONE 
Before the Euro’s Implementation (1992-1999) 
The European Monetary Union, established in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty to be 
implemented in 1999, was, at the time, the next step toward greater European integration.  Many 
European politicians believed that it would not only bring about increased integration, but also 
ensure political peace and cooperation throughout the Eurozone (Stiglitz, 2016).  Thus, the 
motivation for establishing the EMU was not purely economical – the process also had important 
political implications.   
Before the EMU, the European Monetary System (EMS), a system in which European 
countries pegged their currencies to each other was the prevailing monetary arrangement.  
Germany, reunified in the early 1990s, had a strong, export-led economy, and the Deutschmark 
served as the lead currency to which other countries pegged their currencies.  This meant that the 
German central bank (Bundesbank) had significant power in dictating monetary policy that 
would resonate throughout Europe.  Therefore, for countries such as France, the implementation 
of the Euro - a system that would follow a mutually agreed-upon monetary policy - would mean 
an equal seat at the table and an increase in their economic power.  Conversely, for Germany, the 
Euro would mean tying the economic fate of Germany to that of other European nations that 
were less fiscally and financially disciplined.  However, since the economic and political fates of 
Europe would be so closely linked, the possibility of another European war declined almost 
completely (De Grauwe, 2011). 
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At the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, definitive criteria (known as the 
Maastricht Criteria, were implemented.  These criteria were agreed upon by the nations signing 
the treaty.  The understanding was that by the Euro’s 1999 implementation, each nation seeking 
to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU) would meet the following criteria: 
 
1. The inflation rate cannot be higher than 1.5% above the 3 nations with the 
lowest inflation rate 
2. Government deficit cannot be higher than 3% of GDP 
3. The government debt to GDP ratio cannot be higher than 60% 
4. The nation must have participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) for at least two years without significantly devaluing its currency 
against the Euro 
5. The interest rate of the nation’s 10-year bond must be less than 2% above the 
three countries with the lowest long term interest rates2 (European Council of 
the EU)3 
 
If one of the nations did not entirely meet all five criteria, membership would still be allowed if 
the nation was able to show that it was on a reasonable path to attaining the Maastricht Criteria. 
Furthermore, in 1997, the nations that signed the Maastricht Treaty also implemented a mandate 
of fiscal responsibility known as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  Similar to the Maastricht 
Criteria, the SGP mandated that deficit levels be kept fewer than 3% and the debt to GDP ratio 
kept under 60%.  The SGP also created a council to monitor Eurozone nations and issue 
sanctions if necessary.  However, “It also included no formal requirements for fiscal policy 
coordination across member states and took no steps toward establishing a centralized Eurozone 
fiscal authority” (Iversen et al., 2016). Although, notably, the SGP did have the effect of some 
fiscal tightening in southern Euro countries in order to meet its criteria (Jaumotte and 
Sodsriwiboon 2010).   
                                            
	
3	The Maastricht Treaty is available online at https://europa.eu/european-union/law_en	
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 In the decades before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, economists developed a theory 
known as the Optimal Currency Area (OCA Theory).  This theory stipulated the purely 
economic conditions that should be satisfied in order to have an effective monetary union.  One 
of the most important of these conditions was that any economic divergence of the currency 
union not be allowed to become too large, as convergence would be difficult and painful. An 
important domestic tool to prevent significant divergence is the ability to push wages and prices 
down in order to restore competitiveness, thus indicating flexibility in the local labor market.  
Several Eurozone countries did not possess this flexibility, and were thus setting themselves up 
for potential divergence (De Grauwe, 2011). 
 Perhaps the most important criteria for OCA theory is the existence of a budgetary union 
that could help to deal with shocks to the system.  For example, the established budgetary union 
could transfer funds to a struggling nation in times of hardship.  A budgetary union would 
require fiscal integration beyond the level of which the Eurozone was capable, thus leaving out 
an important institutional instrument to battle potential financial shocks to the monetary union 
(De Grauwe 2013; Iversen et all 2016). 
 At the time of the Euro’s implementation, several Eurozone nations had not met the 
Maastricht Criteria, and did not meet the OCA Theory’s condition of flexible labor markets in 
order to prevent divergence, and were thus less likely to converge with the rest of the Eurozone 
(Bayoumi & Eichengreen 1997; Beine 2003).  Table 7.1 shows the EMU nations’ economic 
indicators in relation to the five Maastricht Criteria. 
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Table 7.1.  
 
EMU Nations’ Maastricht Criteria Metrics 1998 
 
Maastricht Criteria – European Nations’ Indicators (1998) 
Country 
Inflation 
Rate 
(%) 
Long 
Term 
Government 
Bond Yield 
(%) 
Budget 
Surplus 
(Deficit) 
(% of 
GDP) 
Public 
Debt 
(% of 
GDP) 
Currency 
Devalued 
in Last 
Two 
Years? 
Number of 
Maastricht 
Criteria 
Satisfied 
Austria 1.1  5.6  (2.3) 64.7* No 4 
Belgium 1.4 5.7 (1.7) 118.1* No 4 
Finland 1.3 5.9 0.3 53.6 No 5 
France 1.2 5.5 (2.9) 58.1 No 5 
Germany 1.4 5.6 (2.7) 61.2* No 4 
Ireland 1.2 6.2 1.1 59.5 No 5 
Italy 1.8 6.7 (2.5) 118.1* No 4 
Luxembourg 1.4  5.6 1.0 7.1 No 5 
Netherlands 1.8 5.5 (1.6) 70.0* No 4 
Portugal 1.8 6.2 (2.2) 62.0* No 4 
Spain 1.8 6.3 (2.2) 67.4* No 4 
Source: European Monetary Institute (1998) 
*Indicates specific Maastricht Criterion not satisfied 
 
As evident in Table 7.1, only four of the eleven EMU nations were able to satisfy all 
Maastricht Criteria.  In particular, the national debt level of several Eurozone nations was 
substantially higher than the required 60%.  The fact that the Euro was implemented regardless 
of several nations being economically unprepared indicates that political motivations were more 
important at the time, and that economic shortcomings were overlooked in order to push the 
Maastricht Treaty through. 
 As previously discussed, the economic unpreparedness of several nations with which the 
Eurozone implemented the Euro would lead to a divergence (particularly in Current Account 
Balances) that almost dissolved the Eurozone.  European leaders at the time of the Maastricht 
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Treaty were neither ignorant nor uninformed of the economic risks of the project and the 
unpreparedness of several nations.  However, the political goals of France and Germany in 
particular trumped these economic shortcomings and the Euro was pushed through (De Grauwe, 
2013).   
Southern European economies were not institutionally inclined to promote an export-led 
system; rather, economic growth was based on domestic demand.  As a result, Northern 
European countries stood to benefit significantly from the EMU because they could continue 
their export-led growth model while other EMU nations lost their ability to devalue their local 
currency to boost competitiveness.  On the other hand, Southern European countries, with 
relatively loose wage coordination, would be put into a tough position in the event of economic 
divergence or loss of competitiveness without the ability to devalue their currency (Hall, 2014). 
These economic differences and lack of preparedness set the stage for significant 
divergence in the years following the Euro’s implementation.  Critics at the time also worried 
about the potential for contagion in the monetary union if a financial shock were to hit one 
country.  Furthermore, the singular monetary policy of the Eurozone coupled with each country 
maintaining its own fiscal policy was another serious cause for concern, as varying fiscal policies 
could lead to significant divergence (Regling et all, 2010).  Ultimately, European politicians at 
the time largely overlooked these concerns and the EMU was established (De Grauwe 2011). 
 
After the Euro’s Implementation (1999-2009) 
 
 Once the Euro was implemented, the Eurozone experienced short-term economic growth 
because of the very advantages that Euro advocates preached.  The elimination of foreign 
exchange risk played a major role in increasing trade flow among European nations.  
Additionally, Glick and Rose (2002; 2016) found in their analysis that the lowered transaction 
 57 
cost and lack of foreign exchange risk is associated with inter-currency union trade, and results 
in an increase in trade flow by as much as a factor of two.  These findings are not Eurozone-
specific, but substantiate the argument that a currency union significantly boosts trade among the 
participating nations. 
 Analysis done by Baldwin (2006) applies currency union research to the Eurozone and 
Baldwin concludes that the Euro’s introduction did, in fact, significantly boost inter-Eurozone 
trade.  His findings are substantiated by Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003) who found that inter-
Eurozone trade increased by a magnitude more than can be attributed to regular growth or other 
external factors.     
Critics of the Euro have argued that the increased trade flow was inevitable given the 
increasing European integration in the decades leading up to the Euro’s implementation.  For 
example, Berger and Nitsch (2008) conclude that, when accounting for the increasing European 
integration and trade flows immediately after World War II, the trade benefit of the Euro 
essentially disappears.  While it is true that European trade had been gradually increasing in the 
decades leading up to the Euro’s implementation, the spike in trade after 1999 cannot be 
attributed simply to inevitability.  Rather, the powerful advantages of the removal of foreign 
exchange risk and transaction costs contributed to the significant rise in Eurozone trade in the 
years following the Euro’s implementation.   
 As a result of the increased trade flow, the Eurozone enjoyed substantial economic 
growth in the first decade after the Euro’s implementation, and the Euro was labeled as a 
“resounding success” in its first decade (European Commission, 2008).  From a monetary policy 
perspective, the European Central Bank (ECB) was successful in keeping inflation near its stated 
target level (2.2% actual average inflation versus the ECB’s 2% target) (IMF, 2015).  
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Additionally, “Intra-Eurozone trade in goods increased from 26% of GDP in 1998 to 33% of 
GDP in 2008” (Iversen et al., 2016), signaling a significant increase in trade among Eurozone 
countries.  Furthermore, in the Euro’s first decade, the differing economic systems of the 
northern and southern Eurozone seemed to complement each other – the northern Eurozone’s 
export-led model coupled well with the southern Eurozone’s demand-led model (Iversen et all 
2016).  The increased trade flow as a result of the EMU could only have contributed to the rise in 
growth of Eurozone trade. 
 However, unsurprisingly, the increased trade flow in the aftermath of the Euro’s 
introduction led to a divergence in Current Account Balances (Carlin, 2013; Hall, 2016; Lane, 
2006).  This divergence was led primarily by the difference in economic models, with the export-
heavy northern European countries benefiting from their southern neighbors’ lack of currency 
devaluing power.  However, Iversen et al. (2016) point out that, “the [southern Eurozone nations] 
were able to grow rapidly because of access to low real interest rates (the low real interest rates 
under the euro were further lowered by expected inflation in the south exceeding that in the 
north).”  Given their demand-led growth model, Southern Eurozone nations had incentive to 
borrow at a relatively lower interest rate than they otherwise would have had.   
 These conclusions are preceded by Björksten and Syrjänen (2000), who conducted 
analysis about the Taylor Rule and its application to the Eurozone.4  They concluded that, when 
taking the weighted average of the Eurozone economies, the ideal interest rate for the newly 
formed Eurozone in 2000 would be 2.4%.  There was significant variation among the individual 
nations in what their optimal interest rate should be.  Every Southern European country (with the 
                                            
4 The Taylor Rule is an approximation of the ideal percentage interest rate increase for each percentage increase in inflation 
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exception of Italy) had an optimal interest rate that was at least 2% higher than the convergent 
rate.   
Thus, southern European countries could borrow at a lower rate than they otherwise 
could have.  This new incentive, coupled with their demand-led growth models set the stage for 
what became excessive borrowing.  Excessive borrowing is generally considered unsustainable 
over a long period of time.  However, over time, Southern Eurozone countries arguably had no 
choice but to continue borrowing as the divergence in Current Account Balances began to 
increase (Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon 2010). 
The result of differing economic mindsets, along with incentivized borrowing, loose 
fiscal policy and lack of competitiveness quickly led the Eurozone to Current Account Balance 
diversion.  Figure 7.1 shows the Current Account Balances major Eurozone economies as a 
percentage of their respective GDPs.  
Figure 7.1. Current Account Balances in Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain 1999-2008 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
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As evident in Figure 7.1, Germany (a representative NEA country) ran rising Current 
Account surpluses, while the southern Eurozone ran increasing Current Account deficits.  
Interestingly, Italy was the only SEA country to run a Current Account surplus at the time of the 
Euro’s implementation.  After the Euro was introduced, Italy’s Current Account Balance began 
to steadily decline, perhaps as a result in its lack of competitiveness over time and lack of ability 
to devalue its currency.  As mentioned, these two factors were a major issue for the entirety of 
the SEA, and trade flows began to significantly favor the northern European nations.  As the 
Current Account Balances began to diverge to unmanageable levels, and the resulting SEA debt 
to GDP ratios spiraled out of control, the Eurozone was ultimately led to the Euro crisis in 2009. 
 
Eurozone Debt Crisis (2009-2014) 
 
Effect on Bond Yields 
 When the debt levels of several Eurozone nations reached unmanageable heights, a 
sovereign debt crisis emerged in Europe.  The debt crisis served to realize a major concern of 
Eurosceptics at the time of the Euro’s implementation – the worry that a significant financial 
shock within a country or region of the Eurozone would spill over to the rest of the EMU.  Since 
bond yields are an indicator of a country’s perceived credit-worthiness (and thus overall financial 
health), an examination of bond yields can serve to help examine how the Eurozone as a whole 
pulled through the debt crisis.  
Several economists argue that a major factor in the emergence of the debt crisis was the 
lack of fiscal integration between member states (De Grauwe, 2013; Hall, 2014; Stiglitz, 2016). 
At the time of the crisis, the Eurozone lacked an institutional method of providing aid to 
struggling countries.  A budgetary union, one of the theoretical necessities of a currency union 
was all but absent – the Eurozone’s overall budget stood at around 1% of GDP at the time of the 
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crisis (Iversen et al., 2016; Stiglitz, 2016).  Furthermore, the Eurozone lacked a creditor of last 
resort, an institution that would buy up risky government bonds in order to prevent that nation 
from issuing more risky debt (De Grauwe, 2012).  A massive divergence and lack of institutional 
support put the Southern Euro Area in particular in a particularly painful position.   
 During the beginning years of the Euro, Eurozone government bonds converged 
significantly as investors perceived entrance into the monetary union as a sort of collective risk-
sharing approach.  In particular, southern Eurozone nations benefited from this convergence 
because it allowed them to issue cheaper debt than they otherwise would have (Mäkelä, 2016).  
Regardless, Eurozone bond yields before 2008 remained relatively converged. 
 However, in 2009, the Euro crisis, triggered in part by the US financial crisis, began to 
call the credit-worthiness of several Eurozone countries (particularly Greece) into question, 
culminating in reasonable doubt that the Eurozone could continue to exist (Bibow, 2012; Darvas, 
Piasni-Ferry & Sapir, 2011; Lane, 2012; Stiglitz, 2016). Several economists attribute a major 
cause of the debt crisis to the lack of institutional safeguards, such as a lender of last resort and 
closer fiscal union (Darvas, Piasni-Ferry & Sapir, 2011; De Grauwe, 2012; Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2016; Stiglitz, 2016).   Without a lender of last resort, each individual nation within 
the EMU would essentially be on its own in terms of paying back its debts.   
 The divergence that caused the crisis in the first place then served to diverge the 
Eurozone even more, particularly in the area of bond yields.  As the debt crisis became full-
fledged in 2009, bond rates for southern European nations (and Ireland) spiked considerably, as 
investors began to doubt the credit-worthiness of those nations.  Furthermore, the pre-Euro 
concern for financial contagion was seemingly realized.   
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Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2016) provide comprehensive analysis on the shift in Eurozone 
bond yields after the debt crisis and the worry of financial contagion.  Before 2008, EMU bond 
yields were generally converged, and Germany, with the lowest interest rate, acted as the leader 
that other interest rates followed.5  Any country-specific shocks generally only affected that 
particular country.  Ehrmann and Fratzscher find that there was fragmentation in bond yields 
after the Euro debt crisis, with a significant flight to quality in the beginning stages of the crisis. 
This flight to quality is unsurprising, given that the Euro crisis coincided with a global financial 
crisis.  At a time of high risk and instability, many investors would naturally gravitate toward a 
safer investment (the safer investment being a bond with a relatively low yield, indicating higher 
levels of credit-worthiness).   
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2016) also determine that the level of spillover and contagion 
during the Euro crisis was surprisingly low.  In fact, “there is generally no evidence of 
contagion.”6  However, the co-movement of Eurozone countries’ bond yields that was present 
before the crisis was significantly reduced during and after the crisis.  The weakening of the co-
movement resulted in fragmentation. Italy and Spain serve as an exception as their respective 
bond yields became heavily reliant on one another.  Ultimately, the Euro crisis had not raised the 
risk of contagion among the Eurozone.  These findings substantiate earlier results found by 
Caporin et al., (2013) and Claeys and Vašícek (2014), who also conclude that there is little 
evidence of contagion, and that any significant movements in bond yields were the result of 
larger shocks outside the Eurozone.    
Although there is evidence that there was a lack of contagion among the Eurozone, the 
                                            
5	Theoretically, a lower bond yield (interest rate) signals a higher level of the government’s credit-worthiness.  A 
higher bond yields indicates a higher payout at maturity in exchange for assumption of greater risk. 
6 Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2017) define contagion as “a strengthening in the transmission of [financial] shocks”	
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variance of bond yields increased significantly after 2009, with SEA countries exhibiting the 
highest yields.  The rising bond yields of SEA economies also began to rise in a self-fulfilling 
manner; rising bond yields lead to a weaker fiscal position, which, in turn, leads to a reduction of 
perceived credit-worthiness (and thus even higher yields) (Mäkelä, 2014).  A significant 
reduction in the perceived credit-worthiness of a significant portion of the Eurozone would likely 
lead to a loss of confidence in the entire union.  Therefore, the ECB introduced the Outright 
Monetary Transaction (OMT) program, aiming to reestablish a convergence in Euro area bond 
yields.  
The OMT is a policy geared toward the ECB acting as a lender of last resort – an 
economic institution that, as previously mentioned, many argued was necessary for a monetary 
union.  Instituted in 2012, the OMT was the ECB’s policy of having the option of buying a 
Eurozone government’s bonds on the secondary market with a maturity date of up to three years 
on the condition that the government in question be set on a path toward fiscal consolidation 
(European Central Bank, 2012).  The OMT program is an important step toward increased EMU 
fiscal integration because it provides a sort of safety net that will theoretically ensure that 
countries willing to put in the effort to get their financial house in order won’t default on their 
credit.    
Also, leaders at the ECB, such as Benoit Coeuré, argued that the OMT was necessary 
because, “the transmission of monetary policy was severely impaired [by the debt crisis]” 
(Coeuré, 2013).  Furthermore, Coeuré pointed out that, “Investors required an interest rate 
premium as a compensation for the risk that the euro might not remain the irreversible currency 
of the euro area – at least in its current composition.”  These developments were unacceptable to 
the ECB, and the introduction of the OMT was seen as a remedy to the deteriorating economic 
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situation in 2012.  On the day the OMT was announced, Mario Draghi, the head of the ECB 
stated, “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro” 
(European Central Bank, 2012), signaling a willingness from the Eurozone leadership to speed 
up financial integration in order to get the Euro back on its feet. 
The OMT program’s announcement had an immediate effect in the reduction of SEA 
bond yields, as evidenced by Altavilla and Giannone (2014), even though the program has never 
been put into effect (Altavilla and Giannone, 2014; Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2016; Stiglitz, 2016).  
In particular, Atavilla and Giannonne find that Italy and Spain’s bond yields went down by as 
much as 200 basis points after the announcement of the OMT, indicating a reestablishing of 
perceived credit-worthiness.   
Although the program has never actually been utilized, it remains an important part of 
Europe’s integration because it signals a Eurozone willingness to provide common support to an 
individual nation through the ECB.  In a way, it is a step in the direction of the “all for one and 
one for all” mentality that some European leaders at the time of the Maastricht Treaty were 
hoping to facilitate.  
 However, I argue that, especially given that the OMT program was never enacted and 
only served to restore public confidence in Eurozone solvency, it is a reactive policy instead of a 
proactive one.  It is an example of the Eurozone introducing a measure that could potentially 
save the Euro were it ever to fall into another crisis, but does not make any strides toward 
immediately and directly assisting struggling economies.  Additionally, the ECB promised that 
all OMT funds would be fully “sterilized” (European Central Bank, 2012), meaning that the 
European Central Bank intends to collect any debt it is owed through the OMT.  This, in effect, 
ensures that the OMT assistance will only be temporary, and the country receiving the aid will 
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owe, in full, the amount of bonds the ECB bought through the program.  
Although, given that the announcement of the OMT program did re-converge Eurozone 
bond yields and has never been put into effect, it is possible that it was never meant to be 
enacted.  It is not irrational to think that Eurozone policy makers knew that the announcement of 
another safety net would boost investors’ perception of the Eurozone’s credit-worthiness, and 
felt that no direct monetary action was necessary at the time.  As a result, the OMT program is 
another tool that the ECB can keep in its back pocket without overstepping its mandate.  
Ultimately, the OMT program served as an important step by Eurozone leadership to restore 
confidence in the Euro, but makes little forward progress in terms of continued integration.   
 
Policy Decisions and Push Toward Austerity 
As the debt crisis emerged, decisive action was needed within the Eurozone to address 
the situation, resulting in a call for strong leadership.  This leadership came primarily from the 
two Eurozone nations with the most resources and experience in policy leadership – Germany 
and France (Schild, 2013).  The Franco-German leadership and resulting Eurozone policies have 
shaped the Eurozone since the debt crisis, and are critical to the examination of the Euro’s 
overall effect.   
In 2010, immediate and decisive action was needed in order to keep Greece from 
insolvency and, as many thought, to keep the Euro alive (Valiante, 2011).  However, at the time, 
the question of how to deal with the crisis from a policy perspective was contested throughout 
the Eurozone.  In order to answer the question of how to deal with the crisis, one must first 
answer the question of how it came about in the first place.   
Two opposing perspectives on the origin of the debt crisis emerged between the two 
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Eurozone leaders.  In the German view, the crisis was the result of a lack of fiscal discipline in 
the SEA.  Conversely, the French believed that the debt crisis stemmed from economic 
imbalances.  Regardless of the differing views, however, both countries firmly believed that the 
Euro must be saved at any cost, and used this common goal as a foundation for policy 
compromise (Schild, 2013).  Although France played a significant role in the policy leadership 
during the crisis, Germany was undoubtedly the main driver of policy decisions, and became the 
leading voice in the Eurozone (Bulmer, 2014).  As a result, many of the Eurozone responses to 
the debt crisis reflected the German mentality that fiscal irresponsibility was a root cause of the 
problem in the first place.  However, Eurozone’s reaction to the debt crisis nevertheless sought to 
address the crisis head-on and save the Euro. 
In 2009-11, Greece, Ireland and Portugal required immediate financial assistance in the 
form of bailouts in order to stay afloat.  To address these financial needs, the Eurozone approved 
bailout packages for Greece in 2009, for Ireland in 2010, and for Portugal in 2011.  These 
bailouts were made possible by establishing the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and 
the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM).  The EFSF and EFSM are funds 
backed by all Eurozone nations and use different financial vehicles through which they can act as 
a lender of last resort to Eurozone nations in desperate need of financial assistance (Closa & 
Maatsch, 2014).  The bailouts also, “violated a core principle of the Maastricht Treaty, the no 
bail-out clause (Art. 125 TFEU)”7 (Schild, 2013).  The willingness to violate a key provision the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) signals that Eurozone leaders believed 
that the Euro must be saved by any means necessary.  In fact, in 2011, Angela Merkel stated, “If 
                                            
7	Article	125	of	the	TFEU	can	be	found	at	http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-
union-and-comments/part-3-union-policies-and-internal-actions/title-viii-economic-and-monetary-policy/chapter-1-economic-policy/393-
article-125.html	
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the Euro fails, then Europe fails” (Spiegel, 2011).   
However, in return for the immediate bailouts, the countries receiving financial assistance 
were forced to implement strict fiscal tightening (austerity).  For example, Portugal was forced to 
reduce its budgetary deficit by 6% of GDP within three years, while Greece was required to 
reduce its budgetary deficit by 11% of GDP in three years (Hall, 2014).  This call for austerity 
was backed primarily by the German government, and underscores the German government’s 
views of the root of the crisis.  Countries such as Portugal and Ireland announced their own 
austerity measures in order to preemptively convince investors that they were committed to 
becoming increasingly credit-worthy (Theodoropoulou & Watt, 2011). 
In effect, these strict austerity measures for countries in need signal that Eurozone leaders 
were willing to go to great lengths to keep the Euro alive in the long-term, even if the proposed 
solutions cause a great deal of short-term economic pain.  This stance marked the next iteration 
of the Eurozone’s mindset about the Euro.  Before the debt crisis, the Eurozone countries 
enjoyed relatively smooth sailing.  At the onset of the debt crisis, the dynamic of the Eurozone 
shifted as Germany, in particular, seized the reigns and began directing the path forward.  The 
German push for austerity, in particular, has facilitated a sudden reversal of over a decade of 
loose fiscal policy in the SEA.  
In theory, austerity measures impose a reduction in government spending and an increase 
in taxes to move toward budgetary stimulus.  However, these measures often lead to a decrease 
in output and economic growth (De Grauwe & Ji, 2013).  Figure 7.2 displays the GDP growth of 
the three countries that received Eurozone bailout packages and implemented strict austerity 
measures - Portugal Ireland and Greece. 
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Figure 7.2. GDP Percentage Growth of Portugal, Ireland and Greece 2006-2015 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
As seen in Figure 7.2, all three countries experienced at least two years of negative GDP 
growth, signaling a sharp decrease in economic output.  Additionally, as De Grauwe and Ji 
(2013) point out, implementing austerity measures in a group of countries can only be effective if 
the countries with which they trade run budgetary deficits.  In the ideal situation, more trade 
flows to the debtor countries and the budgetary divergence begins to narrow.  Applying this ideal 
scenario to the Eurozone would mean that SEA countries such as Greece and Portugal would 
implement austerity measures and move toward budgetary surpluses by cutting spending and 
increasing taxes, while NEA countries such as Germany would run budgetary deficits.  In reality, 
NEA countries continued to run budgetary and trade surpluses, making austerity measures in 
SEA countries painfully ineffective (De Grauwe & Ji, 2013; Truger, 2014). 
 Furthermore, as NEA countries contributed significant sums to SEA bailout packages and 
bond-buying programs, the amount of SEA debt held by NEA banks began to significantly 
increase.  Table 7.2 shows the increase in SEA debt held by NEA banks from 1999-2009. 
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Table 7.2. 
Southern Eurozone Area Debt Held by Core Eurozone Banks in Billions of Euros 
 1999 2009 Percent Change 
Portugal 26 110 320% 
Ireland 60 348 481% 
Greece 24 141 491% 
Spain 94 613 554% 
Italy 259 822 217% 
Total 463 2033 340% 
*Core Eurozone Countries are: Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands 
Source: Baldwin et al. (2010) 
 
 
As seen in Table 7.2, NEA have accumulated a significant increase in SEA debt, with the 
majority of the increase coming during the debt crisis.  This credit imbalance serves to strain the 
economic and political relationships by the NEA and SEA.  Because SEA countries are so 
heavily indebted to the North, NEA countries (particularly Germany) have assumed a dominant 
role in the Eurozone decision making process since the onset of the debt crisis.   
 
The Euro Since the Debt Crisis (2014-Present) 
 
 With policy decisions, such as the EFSF and EFSM bailouts, and the OMT program, the 
Eurozone was able to pull out of the debt crisis and remain intact.  As mentioned, the bond yields 
of Eurozone countries began to reconverge as investors began to regain confidence in the credit 
worthiness of Eurozone countries.  However, several SEA countries have experienced recent 
periods of economic decline.  This decline has been accompanied by sluggish growth in the NEA 
as well, leaving many citizens in the Eurozone dissatisfied with the single currency, and some 
political parties calling for an exit from the currency (Stiglitz, 2016). 
Regardless, Eurozone governments have worked to preserve the Euro through structural 
reform and fiscal discipline, because both NEA and SEA governments realize that exiting the 
Euro would be extremely economically painful, at least in the short term (Hall, 2014).  For the 
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SEA, exiting the Euro could mean imminent failure of financial institutions, and most likely a 
large recession.  For the NEA, a Eurozone exit could mean having to absorb large amounts of 
losses on debt issued to Southern Europe (McKinsey Germany, 2012).   
As previously discussed, a constant relationship throughout and since the debt crisis has 
been the NEA running of Current Account surpluses.  Consistent NEA Current Account 
surpluses have hindered SEA economic growth and competitiveness, and the imposed austerity 
measures only magnify the economic hardship.  The result has been sluggish - and at times 
negative - GDP growth in the SEA. 
Nevertheless, the Euro has maintained majority public support in the Eurozone as a 
whole (European Commission, 2016).  Many Eurozone leaders have repeatedly voiced their 
support for the Euro’s preservation, and have worked to implement structural reforms and 
integration to bolster the Euro’s future.  For example, in Germany, Stability Culture used to refer 
to the Deutschmark, but now is used in reference to the Euro (Howarth & Rommerskirchen, 
2013).  In France, Francois Hollande, stated that, “What threatens us is not an excess of Europe, 
but an insufficiency [of Europe]” (BBC, 2015).  This top-level support has been reflected in the 
Eurozone public’s support for the Euro. 
However, in the SEA, public support for the Euro is significantly lower than in the NEA.  
For example, only 41% of Italians believe the Euro is a good thing, while 47% believe it to be a 
bad thing (with 12% undecided).  This lack of approval is in stark contrast to Germany’s 64% 
approval rating (European Commission, 2016).   
The differing levels in support likely stem largely from the economic downturn SEA 
countries have faced over the last few years, and is unlikely to significantly rise without 
economic growth.  As a result, I argue that, in the coming years, lack of popular support and 
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increased political uncertainty across the Eurozone will be the Euro’s biggest non-economic 
challenges.   
 
The Future of the Eurozone 
 
 As economic growth in the Eurozone remains sluggish, and support for the Euro falls in 
several Eurozone nations, the future of the Euro remains uncertain and volatile.  In particular, 
decreasing support for the Euro in SEA countries could lead to electoral pressure on SEA 
governments to begin to take action to pull out of the Eurozone. Moreover, without proactive 
economic and financial integration, the Eurozone remains vulnerable to similar kinds of 
economic divergences that were seen before the debt crisis. 
 
Political and Social Uncertainty in the Eurozone 
 Several key political developments inside and outside the Eurozone have put pressure on 
the status quo, and will play a role in determining the future of the Euro.  First, the United 
Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union marks the first time an EU nation has decided 
to leave the union.  Although the UK is not part of the Eurozone, the process will no doubt affect 
the workings of the EMU.   
 British Prime Minister, Theresa May, is set to invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in 
March 2017, thereby launching negotiations with EU leaders as to the terms with which the UK 
will exit the EU (BBC, 2016).  The central question of the negotiations is whether or not Britain 
will have a clean break from the EU and become an entirely separate nation, or retain some 
benefits (and drawbacks) of EU membership, such as access to the single market (De Grauwe, 
2016).  Furthermore, the precedent set by the UK in leaving the EU could trigger similar 
referendums in other European nations (NBC, 2016).  If other EU/Eurozone members were to 
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decide to leave the EU, it could mean the start of the unraveling of the entire union.  
 Within the Eurozone itself, political instability has established an increasing presence.  
For example, Italy has had six Prime Ministers in the last decade, with the previous Prime 
Minister, Matteo Renzi, stepping down in late 2016 after losing a referendum on constitutional 
reform (Wall Street Journal, 2016).  Aisen and Vega (2013) and Jong-A-Pin (2009), in their 
analysis of the economic effects of political instability, conclude that political instability serves 
as a detriment to economic growth, particularly because it shortens policy makers’ time horizon 
and long-term macroeconomic policies are rarely successfully implemented.  Italy has 
experienced slow, often negative, GDP growth since the debt crisis, resulting in a popular 
support for the Euro dropping to 41% in 2016 (European Commission, 2016).  Additionally, 
Matteo Renzi’s defeat in his constitutional referendum has been called by some as a victory for 
Eurosceptics (Washington Post, 2016).  While Renzi’s referendum defeat and Italy’s political 
turnover do not necessarily mean that Italy is headed toward exiting the Eurozone, they are 
nonetheless indications of economic and political instability that could end up threatening the 
Euro. 
 Elsewhere in the Eurozone, France is set for its presidential election in 2017.  Among the 
frontrunners is Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far-right National Front.  One of Le Pen’s key 
platforms is to follow in the UK’s footsteps and remove France from the European Union (and 
thus the EMU) (Time, 2016).  While there is certainly no guarantee that Le Pen will secure the 
presidency, she currently is ahead in the polls leading up to the first-round elections in April 
(CNBC, 2017).  Her popularity in France signals the French electorate’s desire for a shift from 
the current policies of the leftist Francois Hollande.  At the very least, Le Pen’s populist appeal 
underscores a growing French Euroscepticism that could be damaging to the Eurozone in the 
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coming years.  
 Although it is impossible to predict the future of the Eurozone, many significant 
challenges have become increasingly present in EMU countries.  With declining public support 
for the Euro and an increasing probability that the political status-quo will be reshuffled, the 
Eurozone must deal with problems that are not purely economic.  How willing and well-
equipped the EMU is to do so will depend heavily on elections in influential Eurozone countries 
such as: Germany, France, and the Netherlands.   
 Regardless, in the short term, it is hard to be too optimistic about the Euro’s future 
success from a social perspective.  As a populist wave begins to sweep over Europe, 
Euroscepticism is on the rise.  The Eurozone public’s current majority approval of the Euro is 
underscored by rising bottom-up Euroscepticism.  If the populist wave continues its trajectory 
toward high political offices in Europe, the top-level support the Eurozone has seen since its 
inception could quickly evaporate.  Whether the increased Euroscepticism will be short-lived 
will likely depend on the outcome of the political elections; but, what is certain is that the already 
fragile Euro, apart from its economic and financial struggles, will also have to endure mounting 
social and political pressure against it. 
 
Economic Uncertainty of the Euro 
 Apart from the social and political uncertainties facing the Euro, economic worries will 
also play a key role in the Eurozone’s future.  As previously discussed, Eurozone policy makers 
sped up the financial and fiscal integration process during and after the Eurozone crisis.  
However, the majority of these policies, such as the OMT program, the EFSF, and EFSM are 
reactionary instead of proactive, meaning that they serve to address a past crisis instead of 
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necessarily preventing one in the future.  Furthermore, the majority of these safeguards against 
the Euro’s failure require that any monetary assistance be repaid, or that strict fiscal tightening be 
implemented.  
 These policies will likely lead to a Eurozone that is increasingly two-tiered, with 
countries heavily in debt (the SEA) subordinate both politically and economically to the creditor 
nations (the NEA).  Germany will also most likely increase its standing as the leading voice 
among the Eurozone because of the sheer amount of resources and leadership it has already 
contributed to keeping the Euro alive.   
 Nonetheless, European leaders still maintain a strong desire to preserve the Euro through 
increased integration (Juncker, Tusk, Dijsselbloem, Draghi & Schulz, 2014).  Joseph Stiglitz, a 
Nobel laureate and outspoken critic of the Euro, agrees that an effort should be made to save the 
Euro and proposes some solutions for doing so. Stiglitz’s remedies center around heavy 
structural integration in the form of a banking union with a common depository insurance, and 
the mutualization of debt within the Eurozone in addition to a budgetary union (Stiglitz, 2016). 
From an economic and financial perspective, these solutions are logical – mutualization of debt 
and a common depository insurance would strengthen the Eurozone’s credit worthiness and 
serve to diversify financial risk in a way similar to a stock portfolio.  A budgetary union would 
serve as an internal safeguard against government default, with struggling EMU nations being 
able to receive immediate financial assistance.  The budgetary union, too, would spread financial 
risk relatively evenly across the Eurozone, instead of it being concentrated in one region. 
 However, Stiglitz’s proposed reforms, while economically sound, will most likely, at 
least in the short-term, never be implemented.  Such a high level of risk sharing would go against 
NEA countries’ view of the Eurozone.  In particular, Germany’s cultural emphasis on Stability 
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Culture is a direct antithesis to the idea of taking on a much higher level of risk by way of a 
budgetary union or mutualization of debt.  Also, France’s growing Euroscepticism and populism 
suggest that the French would starkly oppose a move as radical as a budgetary union.   
 In fact, with upcoming elections and existing political turmoil within the Eurozone, it is 
unlikely that any moves toward significantly increased integration will be made in the short-
term.  On the other hand, because of the high cost of abandoning the Euro, EMU nations will 
also likely not make a significant push to leave the Eurozone. The most likely exception is 
France under a President Le Pen, who has promised to hold a referendum similar to the UK’s on 
France’s status in the EU.  As a result, the Euro will likely endure, but continue to face sluggish 
growth and constant tension between nations as debt levels remain high and economic mindsets 
remain divergent.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 76 
CONCLUSION 
At the time of the Maastricht Treaty’s signing, eleven European countries linked their 
fates to each other and established the economically and politically heterogeneous European 
Monetary Union.  The nations allowed themselves a seven-year grace period before the Euro’s 
implementation, during which they needed to work toward the Maastricht Criteria in order to 
ensure the success of the monetary union.  Even though each Eurozone nation showed 
improvements in working toward the criteria, only a handful were able to satisfy all five, 
signaling an overall unpreparedness to launch the single currency. 
Once the Euro was launched, the EMU nations experienced overall growth as the result 
of the Euro’s economic benefits.  However, underlying imbalances between the SEA and NEA 
began to surface, and the two regions began to diverge in terms of their Current Account 
Balances and levels of debt.  This divergence benefited the NEA in particular, as budgetary and 
Current Account surpluses facilitated stable economic growth.  
As the global financial crisis set in and triggered the Eurozone Debt Crisis, the economic 
divergence in the Eurozone was so severe that it threatened the continued existence of the Euro.  
Furthermore, the debt crisis facilitated a lopsided power dynamic, with the heavily indebted SEA 
having to acquiesce to the NEA’s demands for austerity and quick reversal of decades of SEA 
economic trends.  The austerity measures and overall slow recovery of the global economy were 
particularly harmful to the SEA nations, which have experienced sluggish growth to the present 
day.  As a result, popular support for the Euro in the SEA has dwindled, and politicians are 
caught between trying to please their electorate and catering to the rest of the Eurozone.   
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The NEA, on the other hand, has emerged from the debt crisis as the clear leading region 
of the EMU, both politically and economically.  Consequently, the NEA nations have had to 
undergo few changes in terms of their economic models, and have been able to slowly pull out of 
the crisis.  This consistency is heavily contrasted in the SEA, where immediate and painful fiscal 
changes have been made in order to stay in the EMU.   
In the future, the lopsided power dynamic within the Eurozone, as well as the continued 
divergence between the NEA and SEA will most likely lead to sluggish growth, and continued 
tension between EMU nations.  However, as has been proved several times, Eurozone leaders are 
willing to go to great lengths in order to keep the Euro alive, indicating that, barring some sort of 
financial catastrophe, the Euro will most likely live on despite its hardships and shortcomings. 
A major threat to its continued existence, however, is the possibility that Europe’s current 
rise in populism ends up staffing the Eurozone’s highest offices with Eurosceptics.  Referendums 
similar to the United Kingdom’s are a possibility within the Eurozone depending on the outcome 
of key elections in member states.  This social and political uncertainty further complicates the 
Euro’s future, rendering a variety of political and economic outcomes possible.  
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